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Abstract
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you
do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism
designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of
n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed
partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper o§ers a complete characterization
of the n-person SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. It establishes a
condition which is both necessary and su¢cient for the partially-honest Nash implemen-
tation. If all individuals are partially-honest, then all SCRs that satisfy the property
of unanimity are partially-honestly Nash implementable. The partially-honest Nash
implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments.
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1. Introduction
The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism or game form with
the property that, for each state of the world, the equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism
played in that state coincide with the recommendations that a given social choice rule (SCR)
would prescribe for that state. If that mechanism design exercise can be accomplished,
the SCR is said to be implementable. The fundamental paper on implementation in Nash
equilibrium is thanks to Maskin (1999; circulated since 1977), who proves that any SCR that
can be Nash implemented satisfies a remarkably strong invariance condition, now widely
referred to as Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, he shows that when the mechanism designer
faces n ≥ 3 individuals, a SCR is Nash implementable if it is Maskin monotonic and satisfies
the condition of no veto-power, subsequently, Maskin’s theorem.1
Since the introduction of Maskin’s theorem, economists have been interested in under-
standing how to circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity by exploring
the possibilities o§ered by approximate (as opposed to exact) implementation (Matsushima,
1988; Abreu and Sen, 1991), as well as by implementation in refinements of Nash equilib-
rium (Moore and Repullo, 1988; Abreu and Sen, 1990; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson,
1992; Vartiainen, 2007a) and by repeated implementation (Kalai and Ledyard, 1998; Lee and
Sabourian, 2011; Mezzetti and Renou, 2012). One additional way around those limitations
is o§ered by implementation with partially-honest individuals.
A partially-honest individual is an individual who deceives the mechanism designer when
the truth poses some obstacle to her material well-being. Thus, she does not deceive when
the truth is equally e¢cacious. Simply put, a partially-honest individual follows the maxim,
"Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest.
In a general environment, a seminal paper on Nash implementation problems involving
partially-honest individuals is Dutta and Sen (2012), which shows that for implementation
problems involving n ≥ 3 individuals and in which there is at least one partially-honest
individual, the Nash implementability is assured by no veto-power. Similar positive results
are uncovered in other environments by Matsushima (2008a,b), Kartik and Tercieux (2012),
Kartik et al. (2014), Saporiti (2014), Ortner (2015) and Mukherjee et al. (2017). Thus,
there are far fewer limitations for Nash implementation when there are partially-honest
individuals.2
A natural question, then, is: Where do the exact boundaries of those limitations lie?
This paper answers that question by providing a complete characterization of the n-person
SCRs that are Nash implementable when there is at least one partially-honest individual
in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals. Thus, it provides the counterpart to Moore and Repullo
1Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Sjöström (1991) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013)
refined Maskin’s theorem by providing necessary and su¢cient conditions for a SCR to be implementable in
(pure strategies) Nash equilibrium. For two recent excellent surveys on the subject of implementation see
Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjöström (2002). For a concise and elegant collection of seminal results on
the subject of mechanism design, the reader should consult Dasgupta et al. (1979).
2A pioneering work on the impact of decency constraints on Nash implementation problems is Corchón
and Herrero (2004). These authors propose restrictions on sets of strategies available to agents that depend
on the state of the world. They refer to these strategies as decent strategies and study Nash implementation
problems in them. For a particular formulation of decent strategies, they are also able to circumvent the
limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity.
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(1990)’s conditions for a many-person setting with partially-honest individuals.
The necessary and su¢cient conditions are derived by using the approach developed by
Moore and Repullo (1990). Moreover, given the positive result provided by Dutta and Sen
(2012), no Maskin monotonicity whatsoever is used to derive our characterization result for
SCR satisfying the standard condition of unanimity. Consequently, it consists of a weakened
version of the Condition µ(ii) of Moore and Repullo (1990), which we name Condition
µ∗(ii).3 Furthermore, this condition, when combined with other two necessary conditions,
called Condition µ∗(i) and Condition µ∗(iii), provide also a full characterization of the class
of SCRs that are Nash implementable with partially-honest individuals. Condition µ∗(i) is
a weak variant of Maskin monotonicity, which is trivially satisfied by any SCR satisfying
the unanimity condition, and so it is dispensable for the characterization of the class of
unanimous SCRs that partially honest Nash implementable.
It is shown that if a SCR can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when there are
partially-honest individuals, then it satisfies our properties. To prove the other direction, we
construct a canonical mechanism which involves partially-honest individuals and in which
each participant chooses the information about a state of the world as part of her strategy
choice. By assuming that a participant’s play is honest if she plays a strategy choice which
is veracious in its state announcement component and that the mechanism designer knows
that there is at least one partially-honest participant, it is shown that if a SCR satisfies our
properties, then it can be implemented in Nash equilibrium in any many-person setting.4 By
employing this mechanism, we also show that if all individuals are partially-honest, then any
SCR satisfying the unanimity condition is Nash implementable. This is so because Condition
µ∗(ii) applies only to cases where not all individuals have a taste for honesty.
To help understand the content of our conditions, we present the characterization in
two parts: first, by showing in section 3 that Condition µ∗(ii) is a necessary and su¢cient
condition for the Nash implementation of SCRs that satisfy the standard unanimity condi-
tion, then demonstrating in section 4 that Condition µ∗(ii), when combined with Condition
µ∗(i) and Condition µ∗(iii), also completely characterizes the class of SCRs that are Nash
implementable with partially-honest individuals.
1.2 Condition µ∗(ii) at work
The importance and usefulness of Condition µ∗(ii) is underlined in four applications:
coalitional games, marriage games, rationing problems with single-peaked preferences and
bargaining games. In these contexts, we study SCRs that satisfy the unanimity condition
but fail both Maskin monotonicity and the condition of no veto-power.
For the coalitional game environment, we present the core solution, which is the main
set solution used for coalitional games. We show that this solution is not Nash implementable
with partially-honest individuals when the mechanism designer knows the coalitional function
3Recall that Condition µ(ii) is a weakened version of the no veto-power condition, whereas Condition
µ(iii) is a weakened version of the unanimity condition. Finally, Condition µ(i) of Moore and Repullo (1990)
is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity if the SCR satisfies the condition of no veto-power.
4The canonical mechanism is subject to standard criticisms (see, Jackson (1992; 2001), for discussion).
The usual counterargument to these criticisms is that general results need to rely on canonical mechanisms
(see, again Jackson (1992), for discussion).
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of the games, who, however, does not know the prevailing state. However, as already noted
earlier, this solution becomes Nash implementable when all individuals are partially-honest.
This means that the informational assumption of what the mechanism designer knows of the
identity (or identities) of the partially-honest individual(s) can have profound e§ects on the
limitations imposed by Condition µ∗(ii).
As a second application, we consider the classical model of matching men to women
(Gale and Shapley; 1962). We study the so-called man-optimal stable solution, which selects
the stable matching produced by the deferred acceptance algorithm when men propose to
women: it is the best stable matching from the perspective of every man.5 When the
mechanism designer does not know the prevailing state, it is shown that this solution can be
successfully Nash implemented with partially-honest individuals. This result is in contrast to
the literature on Nash implementation of matching solutions where no proper sub-solution of
the stable solution is Nash implementable in the class of marriage games with singles - as per
Kara and Sönmez (1996) - and where no single-valued sub-solution of the stable solution is
Nash implementable in the class of pure marriage games, where being single is not a feasible
choice or it is always the last choice of every individual — as per Tadenuma and Toda (1998).
As a third application, we consider problems of fully allocating a perfectly divisible
commodity among a group of individuals who have single-peaked preferences over all possible
partitions of the commodity (Sprumont, 1991; Thomson, 1994a). Individual’s preferences
are single-peaked if there is a fraction of the commodity, named the peak amount, which is
judged to be better than any other fraction and if her preferences, on each side of the peak,
are strictly monotonic, increasing on its left and decreasing on its right.
In this rationing environment, we consider the equal-distance solution, which selects the
partition whose fractions are equally far from the peak amounts of individuals (subject to
non-negativity). We show that this solution can be Nash implemented with partially-honest
individuals. Though we do not provide formal arguments, those o§ered for the equal-distance
solution apply entirely to the so-called equal-sacrifice solution, which divides the commodity
so that all upper contour sets are of the same size (subject to non-negativity).
Two other remarks on the Nash implementability in this setting are worth mentioning.
In the first place, the proportional solution, which partitions the commodity proportionally to
the peak amounts is not Nash implementable with partially-honest individuals. The reason
for this is that this solution is not continuous: a discontinuity occurs when all peak amounts
are equal to zero. Secondly, none of the solutions we study in this environment are Nash
implementable with partially-honest individuals in a two-person setting. This is so because
we pay attention to non-wasteful divisions of the commodity.
Last but not least, we look at the Nash implementability of the Nash (bargaining)
solution. In the classical cooperative bargaining theory, initiated in Nash (1950), a number
5A matching is stable if no individual prefers being single to her or his mate under this matching and,
moreover, in each case where a woman/man prefers another man/woman to the man/woman to whom she/he
is matched under this matching, that man/woman prefers the woman/man to whom he/she is matched to
her/him. Note that the roles of men and women can be interchanged in the deferred acceptance algorithm,
and this produces the so-called woman-optimal stable solution to marriage problems, which selects the best
stable matching from the perspective of every woman. In the paper, we focus our discussion on the man-
optimal stable solution since the arguments for the woman-optimal stable rule are entirely symmetric. The
stable solution of a marriage game consists only of stable matchings of the game.
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of individuals face the task of finding a unanimous agreement over the (expected) utility
allocations resulting from the lotteries over a set of physical objects. The Nash solution, due
to Nash (1950), selects the utility allocation that maximizes the product of the utilities over
the feasible utility allocations. This allocation is now widely referred to as the Nash point.6
The normative evaluation of the Nash solution is thus done entirely in utility space,
based on the expected utility functions of the individuals. On the other hand, the objective
of the abstract theory of Nash implementation is to help a uninformed mechanism designer
to Nash implement outcomes satisfying certain desirable welfare criteria. This means that
the shape of the utility space is unknown to the mechanism designer. One way to get these
two classic areas of study closer has recently been suggested by Vartiainen (2007b) in the
canonical cake sharing setting, which we follow in this last application.
We consider a situation where individuals bargain over the partition of one unit of a
perfectly divisible commodity. Additionally, we assume that at each state every individual’s
preference over the set of possible agreements is represented by a continuous and increasing
expected utility function.7 With these specifications, and when lotteries are feasible, every
state generates a classic (non-empty, convex, compact and comprehensive) utility space. We
thus require that the Nash solution associates, with each state, the set of all lotteries that
generate the Nash point of the utility space generated by the state.
When both individuals and the mechanism designer know the size of the commodity
and the space of lotteries but only individuals know the prevailing state, it is shown that
the Nash solution can be Nash implemented in a setting with partially-honest individuals,
though it violates the condition of no veto-power. This is a rather significant permissive
result because several attempts have been made to give a non-cooperative foundation to the
Nash solution since Nash (1953). With the exception of Naeve (1999),8 reconstructions of
the Nash point as an equilibrium point of a mechanism are based on refinements of Nash
equilibrium as solution concepts. See, e.g., Howard (1992) and Miyagawa (2002).9
The remainder of this paper is divided into 4 sections. Section 2 sets out the theoretical
framework and outlines the basic model. Section 3 completely characterizes the class of Nash
implementable SCRs satisfying the unanimity condition and assesses its implications in a
variety of environments. Section 4 o§ers a complete characterization. Section 5 concludes.
Appendices include proofs not in the main body.
6For an excellent survey on the subject of cooperative bargaining theory see Thomson (1994b).
7If expected utility functions representing individuals’ preferences are strictly increasing, it follows from
the result of Dutta and Sen (2012) that the Nash solution is Nash implementable with partially-honest
individuals.
8In a variant of the model of Serrano (1997), Naeve (1999) shows that the Nash bargaining solution
can be Nash implemented. However, this could be purchased at the cost of a strong domain restriction of
individuals’ preferences. For instance, the set of states cannot take the structure of the Cartesian product
of allowable independent characteristics for individuals (see Naeve, 1999; p. 24).
9Moulin (1984) constructs a mechanism that implements the so-called Kalai—Smorodinsky bargaining
solution in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1 Basic framework
We consider a finite set of individuals indexed by i 2 N = {1, · · · , n}, which we will
refer to as a society. The set of outcomes available to individuals is X. The information held
by the individuals is summarized in the concept of a state, which is a complete description
of the variable characterizing the world. Write Θ for the domain of possible states, with θ
as a typical state. In the usual fashion, individual i’s preferences in state θ are given by a
complete and transitive binary relation, subsequently an ordering, Ri (θ) over the set X. The
corresponding strict and indi§erence relations are denoted by Pi (θ) and Ii (θ), respectively.
The statement xRi (θ) y means that individual i judges x to be at least as good as y. The
statement xPi (θ) y means that individual i judges x better than y. Finally, the statement
xIi (θ) y means that individual i judges x and y as equally good, that is, she is indi§erent
between them.
We assume that the mechanism designer does not know the true state, that there is
complete information among the individuals in N and that the mechanism designer knows
the preference domain consistent with the domain Θ. We shall sometimes identify states
with preference profiles.
The goal of the mechanism designer is to implement a SCR F , which is a correspondence
F : Θ ! X such that F (θ) is non-empty for every θ 2 Θ. We shall refer to x 2 F (θ)
as an F -optimal outcome at θ. The image or range of the SCR F is the set F (Θ) ≡
{x 2 X|x 2 F (θ) for some θ 2 Θ}.
Given that individuals will have to be given the necessary incentives to reveal the state
truthfully, the mechanism designer delegates the choice to individuals according to a mech-
anism Γ ≡
 Y
i2N
Mi, g
!
, where Mi is the strategy space of individual i and g :M ! X, the
outcome function, assigns to every strategy profile m 2M ≡
Y
i2N
Mi a unique outcome in X.
The strategy profile m−i is obtained from m by omitting the ith component, that is, m−i
= (m1, · · · ,mi−1,mi+1, · · · ,mn), and we identify (mi,m−i) with m.
2.2 Intrinsic preferences for honesty
An individual who has an intrinsic preference for truth-telling can be thought of as an
individual who is torn by a fundamental conflict between her deeply and ingrained propensity
to respond to material incentives and the desire to think of herself as an honest person. In
this paper, the theoretical construct of the balancing act between those contradictory desires
is based on two ideas.
First, the pair (Γ, θ) acts as a “context” for individuals’ conflicts. The reason for this
is that an individual who has an intrinsic preference for honesty can categorize her strategy
choices as truthful or untruthful relative to the state θ and the mechanism Γ designed by
the mechanism designer to govern the communication with individuals. That categorization
can be captured by the following notion of truth-telling correspondence:
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Definition 1 For each Γ and each individual i 2 N , individual i’s truth-telling correspon-
dence is a (non-empty) correspondence T Γi : Θ ! Mi such that, for each θ 2 Θ and
mi 2 T Γi (θ), the strategy choice mi encodes information that is consistent with the state θ.
Strategy choices in T Γi (θ) will be referred to as truthful strategy choices for θ.
Second, in modeling intrinsic preferences for honesty, we endorse the notion of partially-
honest individuals introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012). First, a partially-honest individual
is an individual who responds primarily to material incentives. Second, she strictly prefers to
tell the truth whenever lying has no e§ect on her material well-being. That behavioral choice
of a partially-honest individual can be modeled by extending an individual’s ordering over
X to an ordering over the strategy space M because that individual’s preference between
being truthful and being untruthful is contingent upon announcements made by other indi-
viduals as well as the outcome(s) obtained from them. By following standard conventions of
orderings, write <Γ,θi for individual i’s ordering overM in state θ whenever she is confronted
with the mechanism Γ. Formally, our notion of a partially-honest individual is as follows:
Definition 2 For each Γ, individual i 2 N is partially-honest if for all θ 2 Θ individual i’s
intrinsic preference for honesty <Γ,θi on M satisfies the following properties: for all m−i and
all mi,m0i 2Mi it holds that:
(i) If mi 2 T Γi (θ), m0i /2 T Γi (θ) and g (m)Ri (θ) g (m0i,m−i), then m ≻Γ,θi (m0i,m−i).
(ii) In all other cases, m <Γ,θi (m0i,m−i) if and only if g (m)Ri (θ) g (m0i,m−i).
An intrinsic preference for honesty of individual i is captured by the first part of the
above definition, in that, for a given mechanism Γ and state θ, individual i strictly prefers
the strategy profile (mi,m−i) to (m0i,m−i) provided that the outcome g (mi,m−i) is at least
as good as g (mi,m−i) according to her ordering Ri (θ) and that mi is truthful for θ and m0i
is not truthful for θ.
If individual i is not partially-honest, this individual cares for her material well-being
associated with outcomes of the mechanism and nothing else. Then, individual i’s ordering
over M is just the transposition into space M of individual i’s relative ranking of outcomes.
More formally:
Definition 3 For each Γ, individual i 2 N is not partially-honest if for all θ 2 Θ, individual
i’s intrinsic preference for honesty <Γ,θi on M satisfies the following property:
m <Γ,θi m0 () g (m)Ri (θ) g (m0) , for all m,m0 2M .
2.3 Implementation problems
In formalizing the mechanism designer’s problem with partially-honest individuals, we
first introduce an informational assumption and discuss its implications for our analysis. It
is:
Assumption 1 There exists at least one partially-honest individual in the society N .
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Thus, in our setting, the mechanism designer does not know the true state and, more-
over, he does not know neither the identity (or identities) nor the number of the partially-
honest individual(s). Indeed, the mechanism designer cannot exclude any member(s) of
society from being partially-honest purely on the basis of Assumption 1. Therefore, the
following considerations are in order from the viewpoint of the mechanism designer.
An environment is described by two parameters, (θ, H): a state θ and a conceivable set
of partially-honest individuals H. We denote by H a typical conceivable set of partially-
honest individuals in N , with h as a typical element, and by H the class of conceivable sets
of partially-honest individuals.
A mechanism Γ and an environment (θ, H) induce a strategic game
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, where:
<Γ,θ,H≡
&
<Γ,θi
'
i2N
is a profile of orderings over the strategy space M as formulated in Definition 2 and in
Definition 3. Specifically, <Γ,θi is individual i’s ordering over M as formulated in Definition
2 if individual i is in H, whereas it is the individual i’s ordering over M as formulated in
Definition 3 if individual i is not in H.
A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the strategic game
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
is a strategy profile
m such that for all i 2 N , it holds that
m <Γ,θi (m0i,m−i) , for all m0i 2Mi.
WriteNE
$
Γ,<Γ,θH
%
for the set of Nash equilibrium strategies of the strategic game
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
and NA
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
for its corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
The following definition is to formulate the designer’s Nash implementation problem
involving partially-honest individuals.
Definition 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. A mechanism Γ partially-honestly Nash implements
the SCR F : Θ! X provided that for all θ 2 Θ there exists a truth-telling correspondence
T Γi (θ) as formulated in Definition 1 for every i 2 N and, moreover, it holds that
F (θ) = NA
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, for every pair (θ, H) 2 Θ×H.
If such a mechanism exists, F is said to be partially-honestly Nash implementable.
The objective of the mechanism designer is thus to design a mechanism whose Nash
equilibrium outcomes coincide with F (θ) for each state θ as well as each set H. Note that
there is no distinction between the above formulation and the standard Nash implementation
problem as long as Assumption 1 is discarded.
3. The characterization theorem for unanimous SCRs
In this section, we provide a full characterization of the class of n-person SCRs which
are partially-honestly Nash implementable SCRs as well as satisfy the property of unanimity:
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Definition 5 The SCR F : Θ ! X satisfies unanimity provided that for all θ 2 Θ and all
x 2 X if xRi (θ) y for all i 2 N and all y 2 X, then x 2 F (θ). A SCR that satisfies this
property is said to be a unanimous SCR.
In other words, it states that if an outcome is at the top of the preferences of all
individuals, then that outcome should be selected by the SCR. Unanimity is a property
satisfied, for example, by the Pareto rule and, in the market contexts, by the rule which
selects all core allocations. However, some interesting SCRs are not unanimous. For instance,
the egalitarian-equivalence rule from equal division is not a unanimous SCR. Therefore, given
the characterization results presented below, there will be limits to the success of partially-
honest implementability: A characterization of the class of n-person SCRs with n ≥ 3 which
are partially-honestly Nash implementable is presented in the next section.
We introduce below Condition µ∗(ii), which is necessary and su¢cient for partially-
honest implementation of unanimous SCRs in many-individual settings. Let us formalize
the condition as follows. Given a state θ, an individual i, a set of outcomes A ⊆ X
and an outcome x 2 X, the contour set of Ri (θ) through x 2 X restricted to A is
Ii (θ, x, A) = {x0 2 A|xIi (θ) x0}; the weak lower contour set of Ri (θ) at x is Li (θ, x) =
{x0 2 X|xRi (θ) x0}; and the strict lower contour set of Ri (θ) at x is SLi (θ, x) = {x0 2
X|xPi (θ) x0}. Therefore:
Definition 6 The SCR F : Θ ! X satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X
if F (Θ) ⊆ Y , and if for every (i, θ, x) 2 N × Θ × Y with x 2 F (θ), there exists a set
Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Y with x 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x), such that for every pair (θ0, H) 2 Θ×H we have:
(1) (a) For all i 2 N , there exists a non-empty set Si (θ0;x, θ) such that Si (θ0;x, θ) ⊆ Ci (θ, x).
(b) For all h 2 H, if θ = θ0 and x /2 Sh (θ0;x, θ), then Sh (θ0;x, θ) ⊆ SLh (θ, x).
(2) For all i 2 N , if y 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, y) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, y) for all j 2 N\ {i}, and if
y /2 F (θ0), then:
(a) the intersection Si (θ
0;x, θ) \ Ii (θ0, y, Y ) is not empty and y /2 Si (θ0;x, θ) if H = {i}.
(b) x /2 Sj (θ0;x, θ) for some j 2 H if i /2 H and θ = θ0.
Moore and Repullo (1990) showed that a necessary and su¢cient condition for imple-
mentation needs to require the existence of the set Y as well as the existence of the set
Ci (θ, x) for each triplet (i, x, θ) with x 2 F (θ). Condition µ∗(ii) requires the existence of
those sets as well. In addition to this, part (1)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) requires the existence
of a set Si (θ
0;x, θ) ⊆ Ci (θ, x) for every quadruplet (i, x, θ, θ0) with x 2 F (θ). Let us give an
intuitive explanation of this set.
Suppose that F is partially-honestly implementable by a mechanism Γ. Thus, if x =
g (m) is F -optimal at θ, that is, x 2 F (θ), whilst the set Ci (θ, x) = g (Mi,m−i) represents the
set of outcomes that individual i can generate by varying her own strategy, keeping the other
individuals’ equilibrium strategy choices fixed at m−i, the set Si (θ
0;x, θ) = g
$
T Γi (θ
0) ,m−i
%
represents the set of outcomes that this individual can attain by playing truthful strategy
choices for θ0 when the state moves from θ to θ0, keeping the other individuals’ equilibrium
strategy choices fixed at m−i.
Given this idea of the set of Si (θ
0;x, θ), we refer to elements of Si (θ
0;x, θ) as truthful
outcomes for individual i at the state θ0 when the state moves from θ to θ0 and x is an
F -optimal outcome at θ.
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Part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) follows the reasoning that if x is F -optimal at θ but x
is not a truthful outcome for the partially-honest individual h 2 H at this θ, then, in order
not to break the Nash equilibrium via a unilateral deviation of a partially-honest individual
h, it must be the case that this x is strictly preferred to any truthful outcome in Sh (θ;x, θ)
according to her ordering Rh (θ).
To give an intuitive overview of part (2) of Condition µ∗(ii), suppose that x is F -optimal
at θ and when the state moves from θ to θ0 it happens that an outcome y 2 Ci (θ, x) is Ri (θ0)-
maximal for some individual i in the set Ci (R, x) and that this y is also Rj (θ
0)-maximal for
any other individual j in the set Y but y is not F -optimal at θ0. Thus, only a partially-honest
individual h can find it profitable unilaterally to deviate from a strategy profile supporting
the outcome y as the outcome of the mechanism Γ.
Part (2)(a) specifies that if individual i can be identified as the only individual who can
find a unilateral profitable deviation from the strategy profile supporting the outcome y, then
the y is not a truthful outcome for this individual i at the state θ0, that is, y /2 Si (θ0;x, θ).
In addition, individual i needs to find a truthful outcome z 2 Si (θ0;x, θ) that is equally good
to y according to her ordering Ri (θ
0) in order to have a unilateral non-material profitable
deviation, that is, the outcome z is an element of Si (θ
0;x, θ) \ Ii (θ0, y, Y ).
Part (ii)(b) specifies that if the state θ coincides with the state θ0 and individual i is not
a partially-honest individual, that is, i /2 H, then it cannot be that the deviant partially-
honest individual h 2 H played a truthful strategy choice at equilibrium strategy profile
supporting x as a Nash equilibrium outcome of
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
.
We are now ready to present our characterization result for the partially-honest imple-
mentability of unanimous SCRs. However, before stating it, we restrict the structure of the
family H to the following specification:
Assumption 2 The family H has as elements all non-empty subsets of the set N .
This requirement is consistent with Assumption 1 since the mechanism designer cannot
exclude any member(s) of the society from being partially-honest purely on the basis of that
assumption. This is su¢cient for our characterization theorem:
Theorem 1 Let n ≥ 3. Suppose that assumptions 1-2 hold. The unanimous SCR F : Θ!
X satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X if and only if it is partially-honestly Nash
implementable.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We make several remarks below regarding Theorem 1.
Remark 1 The “if” part of the theorem continues to hold if Assumption 2 is replaced with
the requirement that the family H is closed under union, that is, with the requirement
that if H is an element of H and if H 0 is another of its elements, then the union of these
sets is also an element of H. This specification of the family H is by far weaker than
Assumption 2 and has an obvious expansion-consistency interpretation: If the mechanism
designer views H as a conceivable set of partially-honest individuals and he also views H 0 as
another conceivable set, then there is no reason for him to exclude their union from H purely
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on the basis of Assumption 1. This specification is the minimal restriction on the family
H that allows part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) to still be a necessary condition for partially-
honest implementation. The reason is that to assure it we need to be able to select a strategy
profile m that generates the F -optimal outcome x at θ as a Nash equilibrium outcome for
this θ and for a set of partially-honest individuals Hˆ which contains all elements of the family
H, that is, H ⊆ Hˆ for every H 2 H. This is because if Hˆ is an element of the family H,
then the strategy profile m supporting the F -optimal x at the state θ as a Nash equilibrium
of
&
Γ,<Γ,θ,Hˆ
'
is also a Nash equilibrium of
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
for every other allowable set H. This
allows us to show that part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) applies to whatever conceivable set of
partially-honest individuals.
Remark 2 Condition µ∗(ii) is a necessary condition for the class of n-person SCRs with
n ≥ 2 which are partially-honestly Nash implementable when the family H is closed under
union.
Remark 3 The “only if” part of the theorem continues to hold if Assumption 2 is replaced
with the requirement that the family H includes all singletons of the set N . This is because
if m is a Nash equilibrium of some strategic game
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
and if individual i’s strategy
choice mi is a truthful one for the state θ, then this m is also a Nash equilibrium of the
strategic game
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,{i}
%
provided that the singleton {i} is an element of H.
Common to the literature of implementation with partially-honest individuals is also the
requirement that every member of society has a taste for honesty, as per Matsushima (2007),
Dutta and Sen (2012), Saporiti (2015) and Mukherjee et al. (2017). Thus, if we follow these
authors and confine our analysis to this case, we have the following characterization theorem
as well:
Theorem 2 Let n ≥ 3 and let all individuals in N be partially-honest. The unanimous
SCR F : Θ ! X satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X if and only if it is
partially-honestly Nash implementable.
Proof. It follows from the proof of Theorem 1, with the observation that in this case
H = {N} and no Nash equilibrium strategy profile can fall into Rule 2.2 as well as into Rule
2.3 of the constructed mechanism.
Based on this result, when there are more than two individuals, the class of n-person
unanimous SCRs with n ≥ 3, which are partially-honestly Nash implementable, coincides
with the collection of all unanimous SCRs. This is because every unanimous SCR satisfies
Condition µ∗(ii) under the specification that the set Y = X and that Si (θ
0;x, θ) = Ci (θ, x) =
Li (θ, x) for every quadruplet (i, θ, θ
0, x) such that x is an F -optimal outcome at θ.10
In the following subsections, we propose several settings where Theorem 1 is applied.
10Note that part (2) of Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied vacuously.
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3.1 Applications to coalitional games
This subsection presents the core solution, which is the main set solution used for coali-
tional games, and it shows that this solution is not partially-honestly Nash implementable.
A coalitional game is a quadruplet (N,X, θ; υ) such that:
• N is a finite set of individuals. A subset of N is called a coalition. The class of all
non-empty coalitions is denoted by P (N).
• X is a set of outcomes.
• θ is a state in Θ.
• υ : P (N)! 2X is a function associating every element of class P (N) with a subset of
the set X, where 2X is a family that has as elements all subsets of X. This function is
called the coalitional function of the game.
Let (N,X, θ; υ) be a coalitional game. An outcome x 2 X is weakly blocked by a coalition
S 2 P (N) if there is an outcome y 2 υ (S) such that yRj (θ) x for every member j of S,
with yPj (θ) x for at least one of its members.
Definition 7 The core solution of a coalitional game (N,X, θ; υ), denoted by C, is the
collection of all outcomes that are not weakly blocked by any coalition S,
C (θ) ≡ {x 2 X|for every S 2 P (N) and every y 2 υ (S) : xRj (θ) y for every j 2 S} .
The following claim establishes the failure of partially-honestly Nash implementing the
core solution when the mechanism designer knows what is feasible for every element of P (N),
that is, he knows the coalitional function, and he does not know the true state.
Claim 1 Let n ≥ 3. Let Assumption 2 be given. Then, the core solution does not satisfy
Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X.
Proof. Let the premises hold and assume, to the contrary, that the core solution satisfies
Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X.
Since the core solution is unanimous, the set Y coincides with the set X as per Sjöström
(1991), and so Y contains the range of C.
Suppose that there are three individuals and two states θ and θ0. Individuals’ preferences
are represented in the table below:
θ θ0
1 2 3 1 2 3
y, z x w y w, x, y, z w, x, y, z
x w.y, z x, z x
w y w, z
where, as usual, ab for individual i means that she strictly prefers a to b, while a, b means
that this i is indi§erent between a and b. Suppose that the coalitional function is defined as
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follows:
υ ({1, 2}) = {x, z} , υ ({1, 3}) = {w, y} , υ ({2, 3}) = {w, z} ,
υ (N) = X and υ (S) = ? for every other S 2 P (N) .
In the coalitional game (N,X, θ; υ), the core solution contains only the outcome x. To
see this, note that w is weakly blocked by the coalition {1, 2} and that y and z are both
weakly blocked by the coalition {2, 3}. However, in the coalitional game (N,X, θ0; υ), the
core solution contains only the outcome y since every other outcome is weakly blocked by
the coalition {1, 3}.
Thus, by construction, we have that C1 (θ, x) ⊆ L1 (θ0, x), that Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, x) for every
individual j 6= 1 and that the intersection S1 (θ0;x, θ)\I1 (θ0, x, Y ) is empty if x /2 S1 (θ0;x, θ).
However, part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies for H = {1} that x /2 S1 (θ0;x, θ) and that
the intersection S1 (θ
0;x, θ) \ I1 (θ0, x, Y ) is not empty, which is a contradiction.
We have proved the claim by assuming that n = 3. The proof will be identical for n > 3:
just endow individual k > 3 with the same preferences of individual 3 considered above
and just change the coalitional function as follows: υ ({1, 3}) = υ ({1, k}) and υ ({2, 3}) =
υ ({2, k}).
As noted above, Condition µ∗(ii) is also a necessary condition for partially-honest Nash
implementation when n = 2 and when the family H has as elements all non-empty subsets
of the set N . Therefore, by a reasoning like that used in the above claim one can also show
that the core solution violates Condition µ∗(ii) when n = 2.11
3.2 Applications to marriage problems
This section presents the basic model of matching men to women and shows that the
man-optimal stable solution can be successfully partially-honestly Nash implemented.
A marriage problem is a quadruplet (M,W, θ,M) such that:
• M is a finite non-empty set of men, with m as a typical element.
11To see this, suppose that there are two individuals and two states θ and θ0. Individuals’ preferences are
represented in the table below:
θ θ0
1 2 1 2
y z y x, y, z
x x x
z y z
Suppose that the coalitional function is defined as follows:
υ ({1, 2}) = X and υ (S) = ? for every other S 2 P (N) .
In the coalitional game (N,X, θ; υ), the core solution contains only the outcome x. In addition, in the
coalitional game
$
N,X, θ0; υ
%
, the core solution contains only the outcome y. Thus, as in the above claim,
x 2 C (θ) but x /2 C $θ0% and, moreover, L1 (θ, x) = L1 $θ0, x% and X ⊆ L2 $θ0, x%. Since the singleton {1} is
an element of the family H, one can now easily check that the core solution violates part (2)(a) of Condition
µ∗(ii) under the specification that Y = X. The reason is that there cannot exist any outcome z 6= x in the
set L1 (θ, x) such that individual 1 is indi§erent between this z and x according to her ordering R1
$
θ0
%
.
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• W is a finite non-empty set of women, , with w as a typical element.
• θ is a state such that (i) every man m 2 M ’s preferences are represented by a linear
ordering Pm (θ) over the set W [ {m} and (ii) every woman w 2 W ’s preferences are
represented by a linear ordering Pw (θ) over the set M [ {w}.
• M is a collection of all matchings, with µ as a typical element. µ :M [W !M [W
is a bijective function matching every individual i 2 M [W either with a partner of
the opposite sex or with herself. If an individual i is matched with herself, we say that
this i is single under µ.
Let (M,W, θ,M) be a marriage problem. Every man m 2M ’s preferences over the set
W [{m} in the state θ can be extended to an ordering over the collectionM in the following
way:
µRm (θ)µ
0 , either µ (m)Pm (θ)µ0 (m) or µ (m) = µ0 (m) , for every µ, µ0 2M.
Likewise, this can be done for every woman w 2 W .
Let (M,W, θ,M) be a marriage problem. A matching µ is individually rational in state
θ if no individual i 2M [W prefers strictly being single to being matched with the partner
assigned by the matching µ; that is, for every individual i, either µ (i)Pi (θ) i or µ (i) = i.
Furthermore, a matching µ is blocked in state θ if there are two individuals m and w of the
opposite sex who would each prefer strictly to be matched with the other rather than with
the partner assigned by the matching µ; that is, there is a pair (m,w) such that
wPm (θ)µ (m) and mPw (θ)µ (w) .
A matching µ is stable in state θ if it is individually rational and unblocked in state θ.
A matching µ is man-optimal stable in state θ if it is the best stable matching from the
perspective of all the men; that is, m is stable in state θ and for every man m 2 M ,
µRm (θ)µ
0 for every other stable matching µ0 in state θ. The man-optimal stable matching
in state θ is denoted by µθ.
Definition 8 Theman-optimal stable solution of a marriage problem (M,W, θ,M), denoted
by OM , is a function associating the state θ with its man-optimal stable matching µθ,
OM (θ) ≡
(
µθ
)
, for every θ 2 Θ.
The following result shows that this solution is partially-honestly Nash implementable
when the mechanism designer does not know the true state. We refer to (M,W,Θ,M) as a
class of marriage problems, with (M,W, θ,M) as typical marriage problem.
Proposition 1 Let (M,W,Θ,M) be a class of marriage problems with |M [W | ≥ 3. Let
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 be given. Then, the man-optimal stable solution is partially-
honestly Nash implementable.
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Proof. Let the premises hold. In the context of matching problems, the set X coincides
with the collection M, and N is the set M [ W . We show that the man-optimal stable
solution satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y = X.
Since the man-optimal stable solution is unanimous, we can set Y = X as per Sjöström
(1991), and so Y contains the range of OM . In addition, for every triplet (i, θ, θ0), let
Ci
$
θ, µθ
% ≡ Li $θ, µθ% and Si $θ0;µθ, θ% ≡ Ci $θ, µθ% .
One can check that for every state θ, it holds that µθ 2 Ci
$
θ, µθ
% ⊆ Li $θ, µθ% ⊆ Y
for every individual i. Moreover, for every triplet (i, θ, θ0), one can also check that the set
Si
$
θ0;µθ, θ
%
is non-empty and that OM (θ0) 2 Si
$
θ0;µθ, θ
%
if θ0 = θ, establishing part (1) of
Condition µ∗(ii). Finally, let us show that the man-optimal stable solution satisfies part (2)
of Condition µ∗(ii).
For every quadruplet (i, θ, θ0, µ) with µ 2 Ci
$
θ, µθ
%
, suppose that Ci
$
θ, µθ
% ⊆ Li (θ0, µ)
and that Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, µ) for every individual j 6= i. By construction, the man-optimal stable
solution satisfies part (2) of Condition µ∗(ii) if we show that µ is the man-optimal matching
in state θ0; that is, µ = µθ
0
.
Assume, to the contrary, that µ 6= µθ0 . Note that the matching µ is stable in state
θ0. So, by Theorem 2.13 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990; p. 33), which is due to Knuth
(1976), it follows that µθ
0
Rm (θ
0)µ for every man m 2 M and that µRw (θ0)µθ0 for every
woman w 2 W . From this and the fact that the matching µ is also Rj (θ0)-maximal for
every individual j 6= i in the set Y , it follows that µ (j) = µθ0 (j) if individual j is a man.
Therefore, it must be the case that individual i is a man and the mate of the man i under µθ
0
di§ers from that under µ, that is, µ (i) 6= µθ0 (i); otherwise, µ = µθ0 , which is a contradiction.
Since µ (i) 6= µθ0 (i) and since, moreover, µθ0Ri (θ0)µ, it follows from the definition of
Ri (θ
0) that µθ
0
Pi (θ
0)µ. From this and the fact that the matching µ is stable in state θ0, we
have that the man i must be matched with a partner of the opposite sex under µθ
0
; that is,
µθ
0
(i) = w. Moreover, it must be the case that the mate of the woman w under µθ
0
di§ers
from that under µ, that is, µ (w) 6= µθ0 (w) = i; otherwise, the man i is matched with the
same mate under µ and under µθ
0
, which contradicts that µ (i) 6= µθ0 (i).
Since µ (w) 6= µθ0 (w) = i and the matching µ is Rw (θ0)-maximal in the set Y for the
woman w and since, moreover, µθ
0
is stable in state θ0, it follows that µPw (θ
0)µθ
0
and that
the mate of the woman w under µ is a man m 6= i. However, since the matching µ is
Rm (θ
0)-maximal in the set Y for the man m 6= i and since, moreover, µθ0Rmµ, it must be
the case that the man m is matched with the same woman w under µ and under µθ
0
, that is,
µ (m) = µθ
0
(m) = w. This implies that the woman w is matched with the same mate under
µ and under µθ
0
, that is, µ (w) = µθ
0
(w), which is a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that
µ = µθ
0
.
Since the man-optimal stable solution satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X,
Theorem 1 implies that this solution is partially-honestly Nash implementable.
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3.3 Applications to rationing problems with single-peaked prefer-
ences
This subsection applies Theorem 1 to the problem of fairly allocating an infinitely divis-
ible and non-disposable commodity among a group of individuals with single-peaked prefer-
ences and shows that the equal-distance solution is partially-honestly Nash implementable. It
also establishes the failure of partially-honestly Nash implementing the proportional solution.
A rationing problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991; Thomson, 1994a)
is a triplet (N,X (M) , θ), where:
• N is a finite set of individuals, with n ≥ 2.
• X (M) consists of all di§erent non-wasteful ways - allocations - of dividing an infinitely
divisible commodity of a finite sizeM > 0 among the n individuals, where the allocation
x assigns the non-negative fraction xj of M to individual j.12
• θ is a state at which every individual j has a (self-regarding) continuous single-peaked
preference relation Rj (θ) over the consumption space [0,M ]. Individual j’s preference
relation Rj (θ) is single-peaked if there is a fraction pj (θ) ofM , called the peak amount
of this individual in state θ, such that she judges the fraction xj better than the fraction
yj if pj (θ) ≥ xj > yj or yj > xj ≥ pj (θ). Furthermore, for every individual j and
fraction xj of M , let rj (xj) be the fraction of M on the other side of j’s peak amount
pj (θ) that she finds equally good to xj according to Rj (θ), if such fraction exists, and
the end point of [0,M ] on the other side of her peak amount, otherwise.13
Let (N,X (M) , θ) be a rationing problem with single-peaked preferences. In state θ,
every individual j is equipped with preferences over her consumption space, not over the
collection of allocations X (M). However, her preferences can be extended to X (M) in the
following standard and natural way: Individual j judges the allocation x to be at least as
good as the allocation y if she judges the fraction xj to be at least as good as the fraction
yj according to Rj (θ). We use Rj (θ) to represent both.
Definition 9 The proportional solution of a rationing problem with single-peaked prefer-
ences (N,X (M) , θ), denoted by P, is a function associating the state θ with the allocation
P (θ) = x provided that this x 2 X (M) satisfies the following properties for some positive
real number λ > 0: (i) xj = λpj (θ) for every individual j 2 N if
P
j2N pj (θ) > 0; and (ii)
xj =
$
M
n
%
for every individual j 2 N if Pj2N pj (θ) = 0.
The next claim shows the failure of partially-honestly Nash implementing the propor-
tional solution when the mechanism designer does not know the true state. This is so because
this solution is not continuous at any state in which all peak amounts are zero.
12In symbols, X (M) ≡ (x 2 Rn+ |Pi2N xi =M) for every number M > 0.
13In other words, if xi ≤ pi (θ), then pi (θ) ≤ ri (xi) and xiIi (θ) ri (xi) if such an amount exists, or else
ri (xi) ≡ M ; and if xi ≥ pi (θ), then pi (θ) ≥ ri (xi) and xiIi (θ) ri (xi) if such an amount exists, or else
ri (xi) ≡ 0.
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Claim 2 Let n ≥ 3. Let Assumption 2 be given. Then, the proportional solution does not
satisfy Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X.
Proof. Let the premises hold. Assume, to the contrary, that the proportional solution
satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X.
In the context of rationing problems with single-peaked preferences, the set X coincides
with the collection X (M). Since, moreover, this solution is unanimous, the set Y coincides
with the set X as per Sjöström (1991), and so Y contains the range of P.
Suppose that there are two states θ and θ0 such that for some individual i 2 N , it holds
that M is the unique worst possible fraction for individual i in state θ, that individual i’s
peak amount is a positive fraction of M in state θ but it reduces to zero in state θ0, and that
every other individual j has the same preferences in both states with a peak amount equal
to zero.
For the rationing problem with single-peaked preferences (N,X (M) , θ), one can check
that the proportional solution assigns the fraction xi = M to individual i and the fraction
xj = 0 to every individual j 6= i. However, for the rationing problem with single-peaked
preferences (N,X (M) , θ0), the proportional solution assigns the fraction yp = Mn to every
individual p 2 N .
Thus, by construction, we have that Ci (θ, x) = Li (θ, x) = {x} and Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, x),
that Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, x) for every individual j 6= i and that the intersection Si (θ0;x, θ)\Ii (θ0, x, Y )
is empty if x /2 Si (θ0;x, θ). However, part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies for H = {i}
that x /2 Si (θ0;x, θ) and that the intersection Si (θ0;x, θ)\ Ii (θ0, x, Y ) is not empty, which is
a contradiction.14
Therefore, the prospects for Nash implementing the solution which divides the commod-
ityM proportionally to the peak amounts are quite bleak. However, this is not the case when
the objective is to allocate fractions that are equally far from their peak amounts (subject
to non-negativity), and so the equal-distance solution becomes the focus of the mechanism
designer.
Definition 10 The equal-distance solution of a rationing problem with single-peaked prefer-
ences (N,X (M) , θ), denoted by ED, is a function associating the state θ with the allocation
ED (θ) = x provided that this x 2 X (M) satisfies the following properties for some real
number d ≥ 0: (i) xj = max {0, pj (θ)− d} for every individual j 2 N if
P
j2N pj (θ) ≥ M ;
and (ii) xj = pj (θ) + d for every individual j 2 N if
P
j2N pj (θ) ≤M .
The following proposition substantiates this claim: We refer to (N,X (M) ,Θ) as a
class of rationing problems with single-peaked preferences, where (N,X (M) , θ) is a rationing
problem with single-peaked preferences for every θ in Θ.
Proposition 2 Let (N,X (M) ,Θ) be a class of rationing problems with single-peaked pref-
erences with n ≥ 3. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 be given. Then, the equal-distance
solution is partially-honestly Nash implementable.
14This proof also holds in the case where n = 2, establishing that the proportional solution is not partially-
honestly Nash implementable as along as n ≥ 2 and the family H has as elements all nonempty subsets of
the set N .
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Proof. Let the premises hold. In the context of rationing problems with single-peaked
preferences, the set X coincides with the set X (M). We show that the equal-distance
solution satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y = X. The equal-distance allocation in
state θ is denoted by xθ.
Since this solution is unanimous, we can set Y = X as per Sjöström (1991), and so Y
contains the range of ED. In addition, for every pair (i, θ), let
Si
$
θ;xθ, θ
% ≡ (xθ) ,
and
Ci
$
θ, xθ
% ≡
8<:
Li
$
θ, xθ
% \($ri $xθi % , 0−i%) if xθi < pi (θ) < ri $xθi % =M and
xθIi (θ)
$
ri
$
xθi
%
, 0−i
%
;
Li
$
θ, xθ
%
otherwise,
where 0−i is obtained from the n-dimensional zero vector by omitting the ith component.
One can check that for every state θ, it holds that xθ 2 Ci
$
θ, xθ
% ⊆ Li $θ, xθ% ⊆ Y for
every individual i. Moreover, one can also check that xθ 2 Si
$
θ;xθ, θ
%
, establishing part (1)
of Condition µ∗(ii) when θ0 = θ. Next, let us show that the equal-distance solution satisfies
part (2) of Condition µ∗(ii) when θ0 = θ. We do it by proving that xθ = y provided that the
allocation y 2 X (M) is Ri (θ)-maximal for some individual i in the set Li
$
θ, xθ
%
, that this
individual i judges xθ to be at least as good as this y according to Ri (θ) and that this y is
also Rj (θ)-maximal for every other individual j in the set Y .
To this end, let the premises hold and assume, to the contrary, that xθ 6= y. Note that
xIi (θ) y and that the fraction yj coincides with the peak pj (θ) for every individual j 6= i.
It follows from the e¢ciency of the equal-distance allocation xθ that every individual judges
this xθ to be at least as good as y in state θ. Thus, individual j 6= i’s fraction xθj at xθ
coincides with her fraction yj at y, and this follows from the single-peakedness of Rj (θ).
Since y is an element of X (M), it follows that individual i’s fraction at xθ coincides with her
fraction yi at y, resulting in xθ = y, which is a contradiction.15 In summary, by construction,
Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied when θ0 = θ.
We next turn to deal with the case where θ 6= θ0. Let us then first provide a construction
of the set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
for every individual i when θ 6= θ0. To this end, for every triplet (i, θ, θ0)
with θ 6= θ0, define the set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
as follows:
• For all y 2 Y , if y 2 Ci
$
θ, xθ
% ⊆ Li (θ0, y) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, y) for every other individual
j and if y 6= xθ0 , then:
Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
% ≡ . z 2 Ci $θ, xθ% |zi = yi, zp 6= pp (θ0) and zq 6= pq (θ0)
for some p, q 2 N\ {i} with p 6= q
/
.
• In all other cases, Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
% ≡ Ci $θ, xθ%.
One can check that Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied provided that the constructed set
15An allocation w is (Pareto) e¢cient in state θ if it is feasible and there is no other allocation that every
individual judges to be at least as good as w and at least one individual judges it better than w.
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Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
is not empty. To see this, take any triplet (i, θ, θ0) with θ 6= θ0. Two cases
need to be checked.
Firstly, suppose that the premises of part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) never apply to
outcomes in Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
. Then, Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
coincides with the non-empty set Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
, which
shows that part (1)(a) as well as part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) are satisfied for this i.
Secondly, suppose that the premises of part (2)(a) of the condition apply to at least
one outcome y 2 Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
. Consequently, by the single-peakedness of preferences and by
the fact that the allocation y is Rj (θ)-maximal for every individual j 6= i in the set Y ,
we have that this y is such that the fraction yj coincides with the peak pj (θ
0) of every
j 6= i. Now, to satisfy part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) we need to have that this y is not an
element of Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
and, moreover, that the intersection Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
% \ Ii (θ0, y, Y ) is not
empty. This is the case by construction of the set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
provided that this set is not
empty. Indeed, if this set is not empty, then Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied for two reasons:
(1) there would exist an allocation z in Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
which assigns the fraction yi = zi to
individual i, establishing that the intersection Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%\Ii (θ0, y, Y ) is not empty; and (2)
every element w of Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
would assign a fraction wp of M to some individual p 6= i,
wq to some other individual q 6= i and, moreover, each of the fractions wp and wq would
di§er, respectively, from the peak amounts pp (θ
0) and pq (θ
0) in state θ0, establishing that
the allocation y cannot be an element of Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
.
Thus, to show that the set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
is not empty, it su¢ces to show that this set is
not empty for every triplet (i, θ, θ0) for which the premises of part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii)
apply to some y 2 Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
. To this end, take any of these triplets and denote it by (i, θ, θ0).
Then, every individual j 6= i receives her peak amount in state θ0 at y; that is, yj =
pj (θ
0). Also, by unanimity of the solution and the assumption that xθ
0 6= y, individual i does
not receive her peak amount either in state θ at xθ or in state θ0 at y; that is, xθi 6= pi (θ)
and yi 6= pi (θ0).
Step 1 : xθi < M .
Assume, to the contrary, that xθi = M . Then, it follows from x
θ
i 6= pi (θ) that pi (θ) <
xθi =M . We consider three cases, according to whether the sum of peaks in state θ is greater
than M or not.
Suppose that the sum of peaks in state θ is equal to M . Then, individual i receives her
peak amount in state θ at xθ, which is not the case.
Suppose that the sum of peaks in state θ is greater than M . Given that the equal-
distance allocation xθ is e¢cient in the state θ, every individual receives a fraction ofM that
is not greater than her peak amount. It follows from this that, in particular, xθi ≤ pi (θ),
which is incompatible with the assumption that pi (θ) < xθi =M .
Suppose that the sum of peaks in state θ is lower than M . Thus, the equal-distance
allocation assigns a positive fraction of M to every individual in state θ, which contradicts
the assumption that individual i gets M at xθ. This concludes the proof of step 1.
Step 2 : If the fraction ri
$
xθi
%
of M exists, then either yi = xθi or yi = ri
$
xθi
%
. If the
fraction ri
$
xθi
%
of M does not exists, then yi = xθi .
To obtain a contradiction, we suppose that xθi 6= yi and that also yi 6= ri
$
xθi
%
if the
fraction ri
$
xθi
%
exists. Thus, from the fact that the allocation y is an element of Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
,
18
it follows that individual i judges xθi better than yi in state θ, that is, x
θ
iPi (θ) yi. So, the
fraction yi that individual i gets at y is an element of the strict lower contour set of Ri (θ) at
xθi , which can be of two types: (1) if x
θ
i < pi (θ), then the strict lower contour set of Ri (θ) at
xθi is the interval
0
0, xθi
0[ 1ri $xθi % ,M1 if the fraction ri $xθi % of M exists, or else the interval0
0, xθi
0
; and (2) if xθi > pi (θ), then the strict lower contour set of Ri (θ) at x
θ
i is the interval0
0, ri
$
xθi
%0 [ 1xθi ,M1 if the fraction ri $xθi % of M exists, or else the interval 1xθi ,M1.
Suppose that the strict lower contour set of Ri (θ) at xθi is of type (1). This implies that
the set Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
contains allocations of X (M) which assign to individual i any element of
the interval
0
0, xθi
0
and, moreover, any element of the interval
1
ri
$
xθi
%
,M
1
provided that
ri
$
xθi
%
exists.
We distinguish two cases, according to whether the fraction yi is an element of the
interval
0
0, xθi
0
or not. Suppose that yi is an element of
0
0, xθi
0
. We proceed by cases,
according to whether yi < pi (θ
0) or yi > pi (θ
0). Thus, let us suppose that yi < pi (θ
0). Then,
the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at yi is the interval [0, yi] [ [ri (yi) ,M ] if the fraction ri (yi)
of M exists, or else the interval [0, yi], implying that the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at y
consists of allocations of X (M) which assign to individual i any element of the interval [0, yi]
and, moreover, any element of the interval [ri (yi) ,M ] if ri (yi) exists. Consequently, and
irrespective of whether the fraction ri (yi) exists, given that yi is an element of the interval0
0, xθi
0
, we can find in Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
an allocation which assigns to individual i an element of the
interval
1
yi, x
θ
i
0
and which is not an element of the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at y, and this
is incompatible with the premises of part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii).
Suppose that yi > pi (θ
0). Then, y assigns a positive fraction of M to individual i; that
is, yi > 0. Moreover, the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at yi is the interval [0, ri (yi)][ [yi,M ] if
the fraction ri (yi) ofM exists, or else the interval [yi,M ]. This means that the lower contour
set of Ri (θ
0) at y consists of allocations of X (M) which assign to individual i any element of
the interval [yi,M ] and, moreover, any element of the interval [0, ri (yi)] provided that this
ri (yi) exists. Therefore, and irrespective of whether the fraction ri (yi) exists, given that yi
is an element of the interval
1
0, xθi
0
, one can check that there is in Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
an allocation
which assigns to individual i an element of the interval [0, yi[ and which is not an element
of the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at y, yielding a contradiction. This concludes the proof of
the case that yi is an element of
0
0, xθi
0
.
We next turn to deal with the case that yi is an element of the interval
1
ri
$
xθi
%
,M
1
.
Again, we proceed by cases, according to whether yi < pi (θ
0) or yi > pi (θ
0).
Suppose that yi < pi (θ
0). Then, individual i does not receive the whole commodity M
at y; that is, yi < M . In addition, as already noted above, the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at
yi is the interval [0, yi][ [r (yi) ,M ] if the fraction ri (yi) ofM exists, or else the interval [0, yi],
which implies that the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at y consists of allocations of X (M) which
assign to individual i any element of the interval [0, yi] and, moreover, any element of the
interval [ri (yi) ,M ] provided that this ri (yi) exists. Irrespective of whether ri (yi) exists, we
deduce from the assumption that yi is an element of the interval
1
ri
$
xθi
%
,M
1
that there is
in Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
an allocation which assigns to individual i an element of the interval ]yi,M [ and
which is not an element of the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at y, which yields a contradiction.
Suppose that yi > pi (θ
0). Then, y assigns a positive fraction of M to individual i; that
is, yi > 0. Furthermore, as already noted, in this case the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at yi is
the interval [0, ri (yi)] [ [yi,M ] if the fraction ri (yi) of M exists, or else the interval [yi,M ],
19
which implies that the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at y consists of allocations of X (M) which
assign to individual i any element of the interval [yi,M ] and, moreover, any element of the
interval [0, ri (yi)] provided that ri (yi) exists. Irrespective of whether ri (yi) exists, it follows
from the fact that yi is an element of the interval
1
ri
$
xθi
%
,M
1
that one can find in Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
an allocation which assigns to individual i an element of the interval ]0, yi[ and which is not
an element of the lower contour set of Ri (θ
0) at y, which is a contradiction. This concludes
the proof of the case where the strict lower contour set of Ri (θ) at xθi is of type (1).
We conclude the proof of step 2 by mentioning that, suitably modified, the above proof
applies to the case where the strict lower contour set of Ri (θ) at xθi is of type (2).
Step 3 : The set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
is non-empty if xθi = yi.
Suppose that xθi = yi. By step 1, we have that x
θ
i = yi < M . Then, the allocation y
assigns a positive fraction of M to some individual q 6= i, and this follows from the fact that
y 2 X (M). Thus, individual q’s assignment at y is yq = pq (θ0) > 0.
Now, take any individual p who di§ers from both individual i and individual q. Then,
the allocation y assigns the fraction yp = pp (θ
0) to individual p. Note that yp is lower than
M given that y 2 X (M) and that individual q gets a positive fraction of M at this y. For a
positive number ϵ > 0 su¢ciently small, define z by setting zp = pp (θ
0) + ϵ, zq = pq (θ
0)− ϵ
and zk = yk for every other individual k. Then, this z is an element of X (M) which assigns
yi to individual i, zp 6= pp (θ0) to individual p and zq 6= pq (θ0) to individual q, resulting in a
element of the set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
. This concludes the proof of step 3.
Step 4 : The set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
is non-empty if yi 6= xθi and the fraction ri
$
xθi
%
exists.
It follows from step 3 that yi = ri
$
xθi
%
. Moreover, individual i judges the fractions xθi
and yi as equally good in state θ, resulting in xIi (θ) y. We distinguish two cases, according
to whether yi < M or not.
Suppose that yi < M . Then, the allocation y assigns a positive fraction of M to some
individual q 6= i, and this follows from the fact that y 2 X (M). This implies that individual
q’s assignment at y is yq = pq (θ
0) > 0. As in step 3, take any individual p who di§ers from
both individual i and individual q. Individual p’s assignment at y is lower than M , and this
follows from yq > 0 and the assumption that y is an element ofX (M). For a positive number
ϵ > 0 su¢ciently small, define z by setting zp = pp (θ
0) + ϵ, zq = pq (θ
0) − ϵ and zk = yk for
every other individual k. Then, this z is an element of X (M) which assigns yi = ri
$
xθi
%
to individual i, zp 6= pp (θ0) to individual p and zq 6= pq (θ0) to individual q, resulting in a
element of the set Si
$
θ0;xθ, θ
%
, as was to be proved.
Finally, we consider the case where yi = ri
$
xθi
%
= M and show that it is incompatible
with the assumption that y 2 Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
. Note that the allocation y 2 X (M) assigns the
entire commodityM to individual i and nothing to everybody else; that is, y =
$
ri
$
xθi
%
, 0−i
%
.
Also, xθ < M , by step 1. Consequently, given that the fraction ri
$
xθi
%
exists, it must be the
case that xθi < pi (θ) < ri
$
xθi
%
= M . It follows from the definition of the set Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
and
from the fact that xIi (θ) y that y is not an element of Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
, as was to be shown. This
concludes the proof of step 4.
A natural question, then, is whether the equal-distance solution can also be a two-
person partially-honestly Nash implementable SCR when the family H has as elements all
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non-empty subsets of the society N . The answer is no.16
3.4 Applications to bargaining games
While the previous subsection considered problems of allocating an infinitely divisible
commodity among a group of individuals with single-peaked preferences, in this subsection
we consider problems of allocating utilities among a group of individuals with von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences who bargain over the division of one unit of a perfectly divisible
commodity. We show that the Nash solution is partially-honestly Nash implementable when
the prevailing state is known by the individuals but is unknown by the mechanism designer.
Then, we will assume that the set of possible divisions - allocations - of one unit of a
perfectly divisible commodity among the n individuals is given by A ≡ {a 2 Rn+ |
Pn
i=1 ai ≤
1}, with a as a typical allocation and with ai as a typical fraction obtained by individual i
at a. This set A is kept fixed throughout. In addition, we take the complete waste of the
commodity as the disagreement point d = 0, which will also be the origin of the individual
utilities.
A bargaining game is a triplet (N,∆, θ) such that:
• N is a finite set of individuals, with n ≥ 2.
• ∆ is the set of outcomes, which consists of all probability measures on the Borel σ-
algebra of the space A, with p as a typical element.
• θ is a state in Θ, at which every individual j’s preferences over [0, 1] are identified by a
continuous and monotonic von Neumann-Morgenstern ordering.17 Thus, individual j’s
preferences in state θ can be represented by a continuous, increasing and von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function uj (·; θ) : [0, 1] ! R such that individual j’s expected
utility of a probability measure p in ∆ is:
Uj (p; θ) ≡
Z
A
uj (aj; θ) dp (a) , for every p 2 ∆.
16To see this, suppose that there are n = 2 individuals and two states θ and θ0 such that individual i’s
peak amount is equal to M in both states, whereas individual j’s peak amount is equal to M in state θ
and equal to half of M in state θ0. For the rationing problem with single-peaked preferences (N,X (M) , θ),
one can check that the equal-distance solution assigns half of M to every individual; that is, xi = xj = M2 .
Moreover, one can also check that for the problem
$
N,X (M) , θ0
%
the equal-distance allocation is such that
individual i obtains a fraction equal to three-fourths of M and individual j a fraction equal to one-fourth.
Note that, by construction, Li (θ, x) = Li
$
θ0, x
%
and that X (M) ⊆ Lj
$
θ0, x
%
. Since the singleton {i} is an
element of the family H, one can now easily check that the equal-distance solution violates part (2)(a) of
Condition µ∗(ii) under the specification that Y = X. The reason is that there cannot exist any allocation
z 6= x of X (M) in the set Li (θ, x) such that individual i is indi§erent between this z and x according to her
ordering Ri
$
θ0
%
. This is so because the commodity M is not disposable.
The preceding arguments also apply entirely to the so-called equal-sacrifice solution, which divides the
commodity M so that all upper contour sets are of the same size subject to non-negativity. In this case,
however, we also need that in state θ0 individual j judges one-third of M and two-thirds of M as equally
good. Under this specification, the equal-sacrifice solution assigns to individual i half of M in state θ and
two-thirds of M in state θ0. For a recent survey of the literature on rationing problems with single-peaked
preferences in which the equal-sacrifice solution is discussed see Thomson (2014).
17An ordering Rj (θ) on [0, 1] is monotonic if aj ≥ bj =) ajRj (θ) bj , for every aj , bj 2 [0, 1].
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In addition, this utility function is uniquely determined up to a positive a¢ne trans-
formation.18 Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we also assume that uj (0; θ) = 0
and that uj (1; θ) = 1 in state θ.
Write (N,∆,Θ) for the class of bargaining games, with (N,∆, θ) as a typical element,
where the set Θ consists of all representations of continuous and monotonic orderings over
[0, 1] that are consistent with the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms; that is, the domainΘ is
unrestricted. To save writing, write U (p; θ) for the utility allocation (U1 (p; θ) , · · · , U1 (p; θ))
generated by the outcome p in state θ.
Let (N,∆, θ) be a bargaining game. Define the utility possibility set associated with
this bargaining game as:
U (∆; θ) ≡
n
(Uj (p; θ))j2N |p 2 ∆
o
,
which is a non-empty, compact and convex set in Rn.19 In addition, since the utility functions
representing individuals’ preferences are increasing, this set U (∆; θ) is also comprehensive,
which amounts to free disposal of utility.20
As already noted in Vartiainen (2007b), for every non-empty, convex and compact sub-
set S of Rn+ there is a bargaining game (N,∆, θ) in the family (N,∆,Θ) for which the utility
possibility set U (∆; θ) is S; that is, U (∆; θ) = S. Therefore, in the actual setting, every ele-
ment of the class of standard bargaining problems in Rn+ is the image of some element of the
family {U (∆; θ)}θ2Θ of utility possibility sets generated by the class (N,∆,Θ) of bargaining
games; that is, there is an onto function from the family {U (∆; θ)}θ2Θ of utility possibility
sets to the class of standard bargaining problems in Rn+. Indeed, from the welfaristic view-
point, that is, from the point of view where only utility allocations matter, these two classes
are basically equivalent.
Definition 11 The Nash solution of a bargaining game (N,∆, θ), denoted by ν, is the
collection of all outcomes p and q of ∆ that generate the same utility allocations U (p; θ) =
U (q; θ) and that maximize the product of utilities over the utility possibility set U (∆, θ),
ν (θ) ≡
8><>: q|p, q 2 argmaxm2∆
(Q
j2N
Uj (m; θ) |U (m; θ) 2 U (∆; θ)
)
and U (q; θ) = U (p; θ)
9>=>; .
Thus, this solution is derived under the so-called welfaristic assumption: The solution
depends only on the Nash property of the utility allocations.
18A function v : [0, 1] ! R is a positive a¢ne transformation of uj (·; θ) if there exists a positive real
number β > 0 and a real number γ such that v (aj) = βuj (aj ; θ) + γ, for every aj 2 [0, 1].
19Its convexity follows from the Lyapunov’s theorem for nonatomic vector measures, whereas its compact-
ness follows from the fact the set U (∆; θ) is the image of the compact set ∆ under the profile of continuous
functions U (·; θ) ≡ (Uj (·; θ))j2N (in the topology of weak convergence).
20In symbols, a nonempty set S ⊆ Rn is said to be comprehensive if x 2 S and 0 ≤ y ≤ x together imply
y 2 S, where it is understood that for every two n-dimensional Euclidean vectors a and b, a ≥ b means that
ai ≥ bi for every individual i, a > b means that a 6= b and ai ≥ bi for every individual i.
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Since the Nash solution is a risk sensitive bargaining solution, it follows from Vartiainen
(2007b; Corollary 1, p. 343) that this solution fails Maskin monotonicity.21 The following
claim establishes that the Nash solution does not satisfy the no veto-power condition either:
In the abstract Arrovian domain, the condition of no veto-power says that if an outcome is
at the top of the preferences of all individuals but possibly one, then it should be chosen
irrespective of the preferences of the remaining individual: that individual cannot veto it.
Claim 3 Let n = 3. Then, the Nash solution does not satisfy the condition of no veto-power.
Proof. Since this solution is unanimous, we can set X = ∆ as per Sjöström (1991). Assume,
to the contrary, that the Nash solution satisfies the condition of no veto-power.
Suppose that there are three individuals and a state θ, at which each individual j’s
ordering over the interval [0, 1] is represented by a linear utility function; that is, uj (aj; θ) =
aj for every aj 2 [0, 1]. Therefore, the triplet (N,∆, θ) is a bargaining game with a utility
possibility set U (∆; θ), which is equal to the convex three-dimensional polyhedron with
vertices at the following elements of the space A:
a0 ≡ (0, 0, 0) , a1 ≡ (0.5, 0, 0) , a2 ≡ (0.5, 0.5, 0) , a3 ≡ (0, 0.5, 0) and a4 ≡ (0, 0, 1) .
By abuse of notation, write a for the degenerate probability measure in ∆ that picks the
allocation a in A with certainty.
In the bargaining game (N,∆, θ), the utility allocation generated by the probability
measure a2 in state θ is U (a2; θ) ≡ (0.5, 0.5, 0), which is an element of U (∆; θ). Since the
probability measure a2 is an outcome for which Uj (·; θ) attains its largest value over the set
X for individual j = 1, 2, no veto-power implies that this outcome is an element of the Nash
solution at θ, in violation of the definition of the Nash solution.
In contrast with the above negative results, the Nash solution is partially-honestly Nash
implementable when there are n ≥ 3 individuals:
Proposition 3 Let (N,∆,Θ) be a class of bargaining games with n ≥ 3. Let Assumption
1 and Assumption 2 be given. Then, the Nash solution is partially-honestly Nash imple-
mentable.
Proof. Let the premises hold. In the context of bargaining games, the set X coincides
with the space ∆. We show that the Nash solution satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to
Y = X. A typical Nash-optimal outcome at state θ is denoted by pθ.
Since this solution is unanimous, we can set Y = X as per Sjöström (1991), and so Y
contains the range of ν. In addition, let
Ci
$
θ, pθ
% ≡ Li $θ, pθ% and Si $θ; pθ, θ% ≡ ν (θ) , for every pair (i, θ) 2 N ×Θ.
One can check that for every state θ, it holds that pθ 2 Ci
$
θ, pθ
% ⊆ Li $θ, pθ% ⊆ Y for
every individual i. Moreover, one can also check that pθ 2 Si
$
θ; pθ, θ
%
, establishing part (1)
21A bargaining solution is risk sensitive when an increase in one’s opponent’s risk aversion is advantageous
to other bargainers. For a recent study on the e§ects on bargaining solutions when bargainers become more
risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse see Driesen et al. (2015).
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of Condition µ∗(ii) when θ0 = θ. Next, let us show that the Nash solution satisfies part (2)
of Condition µ∗(ii) when θ0 = θ. We do it by showing that the outcome q is a Nash-optimal
outcome at state θ provided that this q 2 Li
$
θ, pθ
%
is an outcome for which Ui (·; θ) attains
its largest value on the set Li
$
θ, pθ
%
for some individual i and that this q is also an outcome
for which Uj (·; θ) attains its largest value on the set Y for every other individual j. To see
this, note that Ui
$
pθ; θ
%
= Ui (q; θ) and that Uj (q; θ) ≥ Uj
$
pθ; θ
%
for every individual j 6= i.
By the e¢ciency of the Nash solution, it must be the case that Uj (q; θ) = Uj
$
pθ; θ
%
for every
individual j 6= i. Thus, by the definition of the Nash solution it follows that q is an element
of ν (θ), as was to be shown. In summary, the Nash solution satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) when
θ0 = θ.22
We next turn to deal with the case where θ 6= θ0. Let us then first provide a construction
of the set Si
$
θ0pθ, θ
%
for every individual i when θ 6= θ0. To this end, for every triplet (i, θ, θ0)
with θ 6= θ0, define the set Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
as follows:
• For all q 2 Y , if q 2 Ci
$
θ, pθ
% ⊆ Li (θ0, q) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, q) for every other individual
j and if q /2 ν (θ0), then:
Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
% ≡ (r 2 Ci $θ, pθ% |Ui (r; θ0) = Ui (q; θ0) and Uj (r; θ0) = 0 for every j 6= i) .
• In all other cases, Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
% ≡ Ci $θ, pθ%.
Firstly, suppose that the premises of part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) never apply to
outcomes in Ci
$
θ, pθ
%
. Then, Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
coincides with the non-empty set Ci
$
θ, xθ
%
, which
shows that part (1)(a) as well as part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) are satisfied for this i.
Secondly, suppose that the premises of part (2)(a) of the condition apply to at least one
outcome q 2 Ci
$
θ, pθ
%
. Then, to satisfy part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) we need to have that
this q is not an element of Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
and, moreover, that the intersection Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
% \
Ii (θ
0, q, Y ) is not empty. This is the case by construction of the set Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
provided
that this set is not empty. Indeed, if the set Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
is not empty, then Condition µ∗(ii)
is satisfied because there would exist an outcome r in Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
such that the expected
utility of individual i at r and at q in state θ0 is the same, that is, Ui (r; θ
0) = Ui (q; θ
0),
establishing that the intersection Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
% \ Ii (θ0, q, Y ) is not empty, as well as because
every element of Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
is an outcome of Ci
$
θ, pθ
%
which results in a zero expected
utility in state θ0 for every individual j 6= i, establishing that the outcome q cannot be an
element of this Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
.
Thus, to show that the set Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
is not empty, it su¢ces to show that this set is
not empty for every triplet (i, θ, θ0) for which the premises of part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii)
apply to some q 2 Ci
$
θ, pθ
%
. To this end, take any of these triplets and denote it by (i, θ, θ0).
Given that the utility allocation which assigns Ui (q; θ
0) to individual i and zero to every
other individual j is an element of the utility possibility set U (∆; θ0), it follows from this
that there is a probability measure s in ∆ which generates this utility allocation. From the
22The Pareto optimal set of ∆ at θ is:
P (θ) ≡ {q 2 ∆| there is no p 2 ∆ : U (p; θ) > U (q; θ)} , for every θ 2 Θ.
The Nash solution is e¢cient since ν (θ) ⊆ P (θ) for every θ 2 Θ.
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available ones, let r denote the one for which it also holds that Ui (q; θ) = Ui (r; θ). This
r exists because the space of outcomes ∆ consists of all probability measures on the Borel
σ-algebra of the space A. Thus, this r is an element of Ci
$
θ, pθ
%
for which it holds that
Ui (q; θ
0) = Ui (r; θ
0) and that Uj (r; θ
0) = 0 for every individual j 6= i, establishing that the
set Si
$
θ0; pθ, θ
%
is not empty.
4. The characterization theorem
In this section, we also consider non-unanimous SCRs and discuss a complete charac-
terization of partially-honest Nash implementation. In the standard Nash implementation
theory, as Moore and Repullo’s (1990) Condition µ(iii) states, a SCR F must be unanimous
with respect to a subset Y of X, with F (Θ) ⊆ Y , if it is Nash implementable. Unfortunately,
this condition is not a necessary one for partially-honest Nash implementation. Thus, we
establish a new necessary condition, called Condition µ∗(iii). This condition, when combined
with Condition µ∗(ii) and with another necessary condition, called Condition µ∗(i), provide a
full characterization of the class of SCRs that are Nash implementable with partially-honest
individuals. Condition µ∗(i) is a weak variant of Maskin monotonicity.
There are several key considerations underpinning our condition. These are presented
from the viewpoint of necessity. To this end, take any SCR F satisfying Condition µ∗(ii).
Suppose that it is partially-honestly Nash implementable by Γ.
4.1 Condition µ∗(i)
Let us consider two states θ and θ0 and let H be the set of partially honest individuals.
Suppose that x = g (m) is F -optimal at θ but is not F -optimal at θ0 and that for each
individual i, outcome x is maximal for i over the set Ci (θ, x) = g (Mi,m−i) under the state
θ0. Recall that the set Si (θ
0;x, θ) = g
$
T Γi (θ
0) ,m−i
%
represents the set of outcomes that this
individual can attain by playing truthful strategy choices for θ0 when the state moves from
θ to θ0, keeping the other individuals’ equilibrium strategy choices fixed at m−i. Thus, in
order to break the Nash equilibrium at (θ0, H) via a unilateral deviation there must exist
a partially-honest individual h who can find it profitable unilaterally to deviate from the
strategy profile m. This means that the strategy choice mh is not a truthful one for θ
0 (that
is, mh /2 T Γh (θ0)) and that there is a truthful strategy choice m0h 2 T Γh (θ0) such that this
h judges the outcomes g (m0h,m−h) = z and g (m) = x as equally good according to her
preference Rh (θ
0). In other words, at least one partially-honest individual h needs to find a
truthful outcome z 2 Sh (θ0;x, θ) that is equally good to x according to her ordering Rh (θ0)
in order to have a unilateral non-material profitable deviation from the profile m. Therefore,
the outcome z is an element of Sh (θ
0;x, θ) \ Ih (θ0, x). Let us formalize this discussion into
the following condition:
Definition 12 The SCR F : Θ! X satisfies Condition µ∗(i) provided that for all θ, θ0 and
H, if x 2 F (θ) \F (θ0) and x 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, x) for all i 2 N , then there exists h 2 H
such that Sh (θ
0;x, θ) \ Ih (θ0, x, Y ) 6= ?.
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It is worth emphasizing that the above condition, per se, does not impose any restriction
on the class of SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. This is due to the
fact that one can always construct individual i’s set of truthful outcomes, Si (θ
0;x, θ), by
satisfying the requirement that x 2 Si (θ0;x, θ) when the premises of the condition are met.
In other words, one can always make the implication of the condition trivially true. This
construction is also consistent with Theorem 1 of Dutta and Sen (2012), according to which
the partially-honest Nash implementability is assured by no veto-power when to be honest
means to report the true preferences of individuals. However, this construction is not allowed
when our objective is to provide a full characterization of SCRs that are partially-honestly
Nash implementable. The reason is that the construction of the set Si (θ
0;x, θ) needs to
be compatible with Condition µ∗(ii) as well as with other feasibility constraints that are
introduced below. These constraints are indeed needed because the canonical mechanism
for Nash implementation (Repullo, 1987, p. 40) fails to partially-honestly Nash implements
F . However, if F is a unanimous SCR and, moreover, it satisfies Condition µ∗(ii), then it is
possible to construct the set Si (θ
0;x, θ) in a way that both Condition µ∗(i) and Condition
µ∗(ii) are both satisfied.23
4.2 Condition µ∗(iii)(A)
In order to formalize the above-mentioned feasibility constraints, we need to introduce
additional notation. The class of all subsets of N is denoted by P (N). Any non-empty
element T of the family P (N) is associated with a profile of states
&
θ¯
j
'
j2T
, denoted by
θ¯
T . The state θ¯j 2 Θ can be thought of as the state announced by individual j 2 T . The
profile θ¯T−i is obtained from θ¯
T by omitting the state announced by individual i, that is, θ¯T−i
≡
&
θ¯
j
'
j2T\{i}
.
The maximal set of outcomes associated with the triplet (Y 0, θ, i) for any Y 0 ⊆ X is
Mi (Y
0, θ) ≡ {x 2 Y 0|xRi (θ) y for all y 2 Y 0}. We write M (Y 0, θ) for the set of outcomes
that are maximal with respect to Ri (θ) over the set Y 0, for every individual i; that is,
M (Y 0, θ) ≡ T
i2N
Mi (Y
0, θ).
Suppose that F is partially-honestly Nash implemented by Γ. Fix any individual i and
any state θ¯i 2 Θ. Thus, the first feasibility constraint, denoted by Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
, is defined by
Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
≡ g
&
T Γi
&
θ¯
i
'
,M−i
'
.
23To see this point, let us suppose that F satisfies unanimity as well as Condition µ∗(ii). Let us consider
any two states θ and θ0 and any outcome x such that x is F -optimal at θ but is not F -optimal at θ0.
Moreover, assume that C` (θ, x) ⊆ L`
$
θ0, x
%
for all ` 2 N . Then, Condition µ∗(ii) implies that there exists
a non-empty set S`
$
θ0;x, θ
%
for each `. Fix any agent `. We can construct a new set S∗`
$
θ0;x, θ
%
from
S`
$
θ0;x, θ
%
as follows: (a) S∗`
$
θ0;x, θ
% ≡ S` $θ0;x, θ% [ {x} if there is an agent k 6= ` for whom this x is not
a maximal element of Y under θ0; (b) otherwise, S∗`
$
θ0;x, θ
% ≡ S` $θ0;x, θ%. By construction, one can see
that the intersection S∗`
$
θ0;x, θ
% \ I` $θ0, x, Y % is not empty. Moreover, one can see that Condition µ∗(i) is
(trivially) satisfied. Finally, one can easily check that this construction is consistent with Conditions µ∗(ii).
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Since the set of truthful strategy choices for θ¯i, T Γi
&
θ¯
i
'
, is non-empty, it is plain that Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
is non-empty. Similar to the set Si (θ
0;x, θ) of Condition µ∗(ii), Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
is the set of outcomes
that this i can attain by playing truthful strategy choices for θ¯i.
For what follows, let us fix any non-empty subset T ⊆ N and let us associate it with
the profile θ¯T . The second feasibility constraint, denoted by YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, is defined by
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ g
 &
T Γi
&
θ¯
i
''
i2T
,
Q
i2N\T
Mi
!
if T 6= N , (1)
and by
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ g
&&
T Γi
&
θ¯
i
''
i2T
'
if T = N . (2)
Again, this set is not empty since set of truthful strategy choices for θ¯i, T Γi
&
θ¯
i
'
, is non-
empty, for each i 2 T .24 Similar to Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
, we can view this YT
&
θ¯
T
'
as the set of outcomes
that i 2 T can attain by playing truthful strategy choices for θ¯i while every other individual
j 2 T is playing a truthful strategy for θ¯j. Let us summarize these feasibility constraints as
follows: Let Y be the set of outcomes specified by Condition µ∗(ii).
(A)-(0). For every
&
x, θ, H, T, θ¯
T
'
2 Y ×Θ×H× P (N)×Θ|T |, there exist a collection of
non-empty sets
&
Yi
&
θ¯
i
''
i2N
and a non-empty subset YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, with YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ Y if T = ?,
such that YT
&
θ¯
T
'
= Yj
&
θ¯
j
'
if T = {j}.
Two additional properties of the sets YT
$
θT
%
and Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
will be introduced below,
which emerge as direct implications of the fact that Γ partially-honestly Nash implements
F . The common feature they share is that in cases an outcome x is not F -opitmal to one
state θ, then there must exist a deviant i who can find an alternative outcome that is as
least as good as x under θ and that is an element of the set YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
for some T¯ 2 P (N),
where T¯ ≡ T\ {i} or T¯ ≡ T [ {i}.
First, let us consider the case where x is unanimously top-ranked but is not F -optimal
at θ. Then, x cannot be an equilibrium outcome for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. Under Assumption 2, this
implies that for any element {i} 2 H and any strategy profile m such that g (m) = x, m
cannot be an equilibrium profile for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,{i}
%
. As x is unanimously top-ranked at state θ
but is not F -optimal at θ, it must be the case that mi is not a truthful strategy for θ, that
is, mi /2 T Γi (θ). Moreover, there should be a truthful strategy m0i 2 T Γi (θ) such that i judges
g (m0i,m−i) and x to be as equally good and that g (m
0
i,m−i) is an i’s truthful outcome for
θ; that is, g (m0i,m−i) 2 Yi (θ)\ Ii (θ, x, Y ). Finally, note that x cannot be supported by any
24If T = ?, then we define YT
&
θ¯
T
'
by YT
&
θ¯
T
'
= Y ≡ g (M).
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strategy profile in which i plays a truthful strategy for θ - otherwise, this strategy profile is
an equilibrium for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,{i}
%
, which is a contradiction. By defining YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
in a
way similar to YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, with θh = θ, one can also see that x /2 YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
.25 Let us
formalize this discussion into the following condition:
(A)-(a). If x 2 M (Y, θ) \F (θ) and H = {h}, then x /2 YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
, with θh = θ, and
Yh
$
θh
% \ Ih $θh, x, Y % 6= ?.
Second, let us consider the case where an outcome x is an element of YT
&
θ¯
T
'
but x
is not F -optimal at θ. Since condition (A)-(a) holds, it cannot be that this x is maximal
for every i over the set Y at θ and that θ¯i = θ; otherwise, this condition and Assumption 2
would imply that x is F -optimal at θ, which is a contradiction.
A case that is not covered by condition (A)-(a) is the case where x is maximal for every
individual i over YT
&
θ¯
T
'
at θ and where YT
&
θ¯
T
'
6= Y . In this case, given that x is not
F -optimal at θ, this x cannot be an equilibrium outcome for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. This implies that
for any set H and any strategy profile m such that g (m) = x, m cannot be an equilibrium
for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. In other words, there exists an individual i 2 N and a feasible outcome
g (m0i,m−i) 2 Y such that g (m0i,m−i) is at least as good as g (m) under θ. We distinguish
two mutually exclusive cases.
• Suppose that there is an i who judges g (m0i,m−i) to be better than g (m) under θ, that
is, g (m0i,m−i)Pi (θ) g (m). This i needs to be an element of T . To see this, first note
that i 2 T if T = N . Second, if T 6= N , then YT
&
θ¯
T
'
is as defined in (1). Since g (m)
is maximal over YT
&
θ¯
T
'
under θ, for every j 2 N , it follows from definition of YT
&
θ¯
T
'
that g (m) is maximal over g (Mj,m−j) under θ, for every j 2 N\T . This means that i
cannot be an element of N\T given our supposition that g (m0i,m−i)Pi (θ) g (m). Now,
by defining YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
in a way similar to YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, one can see that g (m0i,m−i) is an
element of YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
.26 In summary, we can conclude for this case that there exist
i 2 T and g (m0i,m−i) 2 YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
such that g (m0i,m−i)Pi (θ) g (m).
• Otherwise, for each individual i, there is no outcome in g (Mi,m−i) which is better than
g (m) under θ. Thus, since m is not an equilibrium for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, there must exist a
partially-honest individual h 2 H who can find it profitable unilaterally to deviate from
m. This means that the strategy choice mh is not a truthful one for θ (that is, mh /2
T Γh (θ)) and that there is a truthful strategy choice m
0
h 2 T Γh (θ) such that this h judges
g (m0h,m−h) and g (m) as equally good under θ; that is, g (m
0
h,m−h) 2 Ih (θ, x, Y ).
25Recall that θ¯
T
−h ≡
&
θ¯
T
j
'
j2T\{h}
.
26Recall that by Condition (A)-(0), it follows that YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
≡ Y if T\ {i} = ?.
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Observe that if h 2 T , then it must be the case that θ¯h 6= θ; otherwise, this h cannot
find any profitable unilateral deviation. Now, by defining YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
in a way
similar to YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, one can see that g (m0i,m−i) is also an element of YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
.
In summary, we can conclude that for this case there exists an h 2 H for whom the
intersection YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
\ Ih
$
θh, x, Y
%
is not empty, where θh = θ, and for whom
θ¯
h 6= θ if h 2 T . Hence:
(A)-(b). If T 6= ? and x 2 M
&
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, θ
'
\F (θ), then there exist i 2 T and y 2
YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
such that yPi (θ) x, otherwise, there exists h 2 H, with θ¯h 6= θ if h 2 T , for
whom YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
\ Ih
$
θh, x, Y
% 6= ?, where θh = θ.
In summary, if F is partially-honestly Nash implementable, then the following condition
must be satisfied:
Definition 13 The SCR F : Θ! X satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)(A) provided that it satisfies
Condition (A)-(0), Condition (A)-(a), and Condition (A)-(b).
Remark 4 If F is a unanimous SCR, then we can set Y = X = Yi (θ) = YT
&
θ¯
T
'
for all
T 2 P (N), all θ¯T and all θ. Under these definitions, one can see that Condition µ∗(iii)(A)
is satisfied.
4.3 Condition µ∗(iii)(B)
In this subsection, we present the last condition that emerges as a direct implication of
the fact that Γ partially-honestly Nash implements F . We name this condition as Condition
µ∗(iii)(B). To introduce this condition, we need to lay down its premises. To this end,
suppose that F is partially-honestly Nash implemented by Γ. Thus, it satisfies Condition
(A)-(0).
First, fix any individual i, any H and any θ and θ0. Suppose that x is F -optimal at θ.
Also, assume that when the state moves from θ to θ0 an outcome z 2 Ci (θ, x) is maximal for i
over Ci (θ, x) under θ
0 but this z is not F -optimal at θ0. Note that since N is an element ofH,
by Assumption 2, there exists a profile m such that m is an equilibrium for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,N
%
and
that g (m) = x. As we have already discussed in section 3, Ci (θ, x) = g (Mi,m−i) represents
the set of outcomes that i can generate by varying her own strategy, keeping the other
individuals’ equilibrium strategy choices fixed at m−i. Then, given that m is an equilibrium
for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,N
%
such that g (m) = x and that z 2 Ci (θ, x), it follows that g (m0i,m−i) = z for
some m0i 2 Mi. To economize on notation, we write m0 for (m0i,m−i). Observe that m0 is
not an equilibrium for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ0,H
%
given that z is not F -optimal at θ0.
Before proceeding with the discussion of Condition µ∗(iii)(B), recall that set Si (θ
0;x, θ) =
g
$
T Γi (θ
0) ,m−i
%
represents the set of outcomes that i can attain by playing truthful strategy
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choices for θ0 when the state moves from θ to θ0, keeping the other individuals’ equilibrium
strategy choices fixed at m−i.
Second, fix any non-empty set T 2 P (N) and any profile θ¯T such that T satisfies at
least one of the following properties:
(I) i 2 T =) z 2 Si
&
θ¯
i
;x, θ
'
; and
(II) T\ {i} 6= ? =) x 2 Sk (θ;x, θ) with θ = θ¯k for any k 2 T\ {i}.
Given our interpretation of the pair
&
T, θ¯
T
'
, it is clear that if i is an element of T ,
then i is playing a truthful strategy choice for θ¯i, and so z is an i’s truthful outcome for θ¯i.
Similarly, if k is an element of T\ {i}, then property (II) requires that this k is playing a
truthful strategy choice for θ = θ¯k, and so x is a k’s truthful outcome for θ. By defining the
set YT
&
θ¯
T
'
of Condition (A)-(0) as in (1) or as in (2), one can see that z 2 YT
&
θ¯
T
'
.27
Third, let us suppose that at least one of the following cases holds:
(1) Si (θ
0;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ0, z) and T 6= ?;
(2) i /2 H; and
(3) i 2 T with θ¯i = θ0.
Suppose that case (1) applies. This implies that z is not an i’s truthful outcome for θ0 and
that i cannot find any profitable unilateral deviation fromm0 given that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, z).
However, given that m0 is not an equilibrium for
$
Γ,<Γ,θ0,H
%
, there exist an ` 6= i and
an outcome g
$
m00` ,m
0
−`
%
such that g
$
m00` ,m
0
−`
%
R` (θ
0) g (m0). We distinguish two mutually
exclusive cases.
(α) Suppose that for each individual ` 6= i, there is no outcome in g $M`,m0−`% which
is better than g (m0) = z under θ0. This implies that g
$
M`,m
0
−`
% ⊆ L` (θ0, z), for
every ` 6= i. Given that i cannot find any profitable unilateral deviation from m0,
it must be the case that the deviant ` needs to be a partially-honest individual in
H\ {i} such that g $m00` ,m0−`% I` (θ0) g (m0), that m00` 2 T Γ` (θ0) and that m0` /2 T Γ` (θ0).
Then, g
$
m00` ,m
0
−`
% 2 I` (θ0, z, Y ). Observe that if ` 2 T , then property (II) implies
that θ¯` = θ, and so it must be the case that θ 6= θ0; otherwise, this ` cannot find any
profitable unilateral deviation. By defining YT[{`}
&
θ¯
T
−`, θ
`
'
in a way similar to YT
&
θ¯
T
'
,
one can see that g
$
m00` ,m
0
−`
%
is also an element of YT[{`}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
`
'
. In summary,
we can conclude that for this case there exists an h 2 H for whom the intersection
YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
\ Ih
$
θh, x, Y
%
is not empty, where θh = θ0, and for whom θ¯h 6= θ0 if
h 2 T .
(β) Suppose that g
$
m00` ,m
0
−`
%
P` (θ
0) g (m0) for some ` 6= i. Then, by defining YT\{`}
&
θ¯
T
−`
'
in a way similar to YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, one can see that g
$
m00` ,m
0
−`
%
is an element of YT\{`}
&
θ¯
T
−`
'
.28
27In the case where the set T were an empty set, one can also see that z 2 YT
&
θ¯
T
'
= Y , by Condition
(A)-(0). Also, note that properties (I)-(II) are both satisfied in the case where T = ?.
28Recall that by Condition (A)-(0), it follows that YT\{`}
&
θ¯
T
−`
'
≡ Y if T\ {`} = ?.
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In summary, we can conclude for this case that there exist an individual ` 6= i and an
outcome g
$
m00` ,m
0
−`
% 2 YT\{`} &θ¯T−`' such that g $m00` ,m0−`%P` (θ) g (m0).
By a similar reasoning and by invoking property (I) in the case that i 2 T , one can
show that either (α) or (β) holds in case (2) as well as in case (3). Therefore:
Definition 14 The SCR F : Θ ! X satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)(B) provided for all i 2 N ,
all θ and θ0, all T and θ¯T , and all H, if x 2 F (θ), z 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, z) and z /2 F (θ0)
and if, moreover, T satisfies at least one of the following properties:
(I) i 2 T =) z 2 Si
&
θ¯
i
;x, θ
'
;
(II) T\ {i} 6= ? =) x 2 Sk (θ;x, θ) with θ = θ¯k for each k 2 T\ {i},
then z 2 YT
&
θ¯
T
'
. Moreover, if at least one of the following three requirements are satisfied:
(1) Si (θ
0;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ0, z) and T 6= ?; (2) i /2 H; (3) i 2 T with θ¯i = θ0, then one of the
following two statements holds:
(α) there exists h 2 H\ {i}, with θ0 6= θ if h 2 T , for whom YT[{h}
&
θ
T
−h, θ
h
'
\Ih
$
θh, z, Y
% 6=
?, where θh = θ0;
(β) there exist ` 2 N\ {i} and z(`) 2 YT\{`}
&
θ
T
−`
'
such that z(`)P` (θ
0) z.
Remark 5 If F is unanimous, then we can set Y = X = YT
&
θ¯
T
'
for all
&
T, θ¯
T
'
. Condition
µ∗(iii)-(B) is (trivially) satisfied, since for every individual ` we can always take an element
of X so as to meet either (α) or (β).
Remark 6 Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) implies Condition µ∗(ii)-(2)-(b).
In what follows, we say a SCR satisfiesCondition µ∗(iii) if it satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)(A)
and Condition µ∗(iii)(B). Moreover, we say that F satisfies Condition µ∗ if it satisfies Con-
dition µ∗(i), Condition µ∗(ii) and Condition µ∗(iii). Now, we are ready to state our charac-
terization of SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable.
Theorem 3 Let n ≥ 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 and that Assumption 2 hold. The SCR
F : Θ! X is partially-honestly Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies Condition µ∗.
Proof. Suppose that F is partially-honestly Nash implementable. The proof of Theorem 1
in Appendix A shows that F satisfies Condition µ∗(ii). The proof that F satisfies Condition
µ∗(i) as well as Condition µ∗(iii) is relegated in Appendix C. Suppose that F satisfies Con-
dition µ∗(i), Condition µ∗(ii) and Condition µ∗(iii). The proof that F is partially-honestly
Nash implementable can be found in Appendix B.
4.4 On the implementability of the egalitarian bargaining alloca-
tion rule
It is well-known that the egalitarian solution, defined over bargaining problems, is not a
unanimous solution. In what follows, we show that this solution satisfies Condition µ∗, and
so it is partially-honestly Nash implementable according to Theorem 3.
31
Like in section 3.4, here we assume allocation problems of infinitely divisible commodities
among a group of individuals. However, unlike in section 3.4, we will not assume that
each individual’s preference is represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility
function.29 Here, we simply assume that individual i’s preference over her consumption
space is continuous, monotonic, and convex. Then, it admits a numerical represetantion.
Moreover, following Roemer (1986, 1988) and Yoshihara (2003), a bargaining solution is
defined as an allocation rule that associates a subset of feasible allocations to a profile of
utility functions.
Let us consider allocation problems in pure exchange economies, as in Roemer (1986,
1988). Let X ≡ (x = (x1, . . . , xn) 2 Rnm+ |Pi2N xi ≤ !) be the set of feasible allocations,
with ! 2 Rm++ as the fixed social endowment of m commodities. Let Rm+ be the consumption
space common to all individuals. For each i 2 N and each state θ 2 Θ, let ui (·; θ) be a
continuous, increasing, and concave utility function in state θ, which is defined by ui (·; θ) :
Rm+ ! R+ with ui (0; θ) = 0 and ui (xi; θ) > 0 for all xi 2 Rm++. Then, given θ 2 Θ, the utility
possibility set is given by U (θ) ≡ (u (x) ≡ (ui (xi; θ))i2N 2 Rn+ | x 2 X) with 0 2 U (θ).
Let the disagreement point be fixed by d = 0 throughout this section. Then, the class of
bargaining problems is defined by U ≡ {U (θ) | θ 2 Θ}. The egalitarian solution is a mapping
E : U ! Rn+ such that for each U (θ) 2 U , E (U (θ)) 2 Rn++ satisfies the following properties:
(a) Ei (U (θ)) = Ej (U (θ)) holds for any i, j 2 N , and (b) there is no u (x) 2 U (θ) such that
u (x) ≫ E (U (θ)). Moreover, a bargaining allocation rule is a correspondence ' : Θ ! X
such that (i) for each θ 2 Θ, ' (θ) 6= ?, (ii) for any x, x0 2 ' (θ), u (x) = u (x0) holds, and
(iii) for any x00 2 X with u (x00) = u (x) for some x 2 ' (θ), x00 2 ' (θ) holds. A bargaining
allocation rule ' is an egalitarian bargaining solution, denoted by 'E, if and only if for each
θ 2 Θ, u $'E (θ)% = E (U (θ)) holds.
It is well-known that 'E is not Nash implementable, since it does not satisfy Maskin
monotonicity. This is because the class of bargaining problems contains (not necessarily
strict) comprehensive and convex problems derived from the class of continuous, (not neces-
sarily strongly) increasing, and concave utility functions, and thus a non-egalitarian, unan-
imously top-ranked utility allocation can exist for some bargaining problems. Thus, we
cannot test the partially-honest implementability of 'E by applying the characterization re-
sult of Theorem 1. By applying the characterization result of Theorem 3, however, we can
show that 'E is partially-honestly Nash implementable.
Proposition 4 Let (N,X,Θ) be a class of pure exchange economies with n ≥ 3. Let
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 be given. Then, the egalitarian bargaining solution 'E is
partially-honestly Nash implementable.
Proof. We show that 'E satisfies Condition µ∗ with respect to X.
(i) First, let us show that 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(ii). Take any θ 2 Θ and any x 2
'E (θ). Then, let Ci (θ, x) ≡ Li (θ, x) ≡ {y 2 X | ui (yi; θ) ≤ ui (xi; θ)} for each i 2 N .
Given x 2 X and i 2 N , let x0i ≡ (xi,0−i) where 0−i means that any individual other
than i receives the zero consumption bundle. Given a possibility that there exists y∗ 2
29We do not need to assume vNM utility preferences in underlying economic environments of bargaining
problems, since the egalitarian solution cannot satisfy the so-called Scale Invariance axiom.
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0\N\{i}Mj (X, θ)1 \'E (θ), let us define the following subset of individuals:
S =
(
j 2 N | uj
$
y∗j ; θ
%
= uj (xj; θ) for some y∗ 2
0\N\{i}Mj (X, θ)1 \'E (θ) and some i 2 N) .
Note that if there exists y∗ 2 0\N\{i}Mj (X, θ)1 \'E (θ) and y∗ 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, y∗) holds,
then i 2 S.
Then, for each j 2 N , let us define the set Sj (θ0;x, θ) as follows:
(a) if j 2 S, then
Sj (θ
0;x, θ) ≡ [y2argmaxz2Cj(θ,x) uj(zj ;θ0)
(
y0j
) [ {x} if and only if θ0 = θ;
Sj (θ
0;x, θ) ≡ [y2argmaxz2Cj(θ,x) uj(zj ;θ0)
(
y0j
)
if and only if θ0 6= θ.
(b) if j /2 S, then
Sj (θ
0;x, θ) ≡ SLj (θ, x) if and only if θ0 = θ;
Sj (θ
0;x, θ) ≡ [y2argmaxz2Cj(θ,x) uj(zj ;θ0)
(
y0j
)
if and only if θ0 6= θ.
Such a definition of Sj (θ
0;x, θ) is well-defined, since 0 2 Sj (θ;x, θ) andmaxz2Cj(θ,x) uj (zj; θ0)
is well-defined by the compactness of Cj (θ, x) = Lj (θ, x) and the continuity of uj (·; θ0).
Moreover, Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied with this definition. First, by the definition, Si (θ
0;x, θ) ⊆
Li (θ, x) = Ci (θ, x) for all i 2 N . Thus, part (1)-(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied.
Second, for every i 2 N , if θ0 = θ, then x 2 Si (θ0;x, θ) or Si (θ0;x, θ) = SLi (θ, x)
holds. Therefore, part (1)-(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied. Third, let y /2 'E (θ0) sat-
isfy y 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, y) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, y) for all j 6= i. Suppose θ0 6= θ. Then
by the definition, y0i 2 Si (θ0;x, θ) \ Ii (θ0, y,X) holds, and y 6= y0i holds by y 2 Ci (θ, x),
uj (yj; θ
0) > uj (0; θ
0), and Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, y) for all j 6= i. Therefore, y /2 Si (θ0;x, θ). Thus,
part (2)-(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied. Suppose θ0 = θ. Then, the set S is non-
empty and i 2 S. Then by the definition, y0i 2 Si (θ0;x, θ) \ Ii (θ0, y,X) holds, and y 6= y0i
holds by y 2 Ci (θ, x), uj (yj; θ0) > uj (0; θ0), and Y ⊆ Lj (θ0, y) for all j 6= i. Therefore,
y /2 Si (θ0;x, θ). Thus, part (2)-(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied. Thus, in summary, part
(2)-(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) is satisfied.
(ii) Second, let us show that 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(A).
Let
X0i ≡
(
x0i 2 Rnm+ | 9x 2 X : x0i = (xi,0−i)
)
,
and X0 ≡ [i2NX0i . Take any
&
x, θ, H, T, θ¯
T
'
2 X × Θ × H× P (N) × Θ|T |, and let
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ X\
h
[i2TM
&
X, θ¯
i
'i
if T 6= ?; and YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ X if T = ?. For any i 2 N , let
Yi (θ) ≡ X\M (X, θ), Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
≡ X\M
&
X, θ¯
i
'
, and YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
≡ X\
h
[j2T\{i}M
&
X, θ¯
j
'i
.
Moreover, for any h 2 H, let YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
≡ X\
h
[i2T\{h}M
&
X, θ¯
i
'
[M $X, θh%i for
any θh 2 Θ. These specifications are consistent with the requirements of Condition µ∗(iii).
To see 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)-(a), let x 2M (X, θ), x /2 'E (θ), and H = {h}.
Note that YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
= X\
h
[i2T\{h}M
&
X, θ¯
i
'
[M $X, θh%i for θh = θ. Therefore,
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x 2M (X, θ) implies x /2 YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
holds for θh = θ. Moreover, let z(h,θ) ≡ (xh,0−h) =
x0h. Then, z
(h,θ) 2 Yh (θ) \ Ih (θ, x,X) holds, as Yh (θ) = X\M (X, θ) ⊇ X0, by our specifi-
cation. Thus, 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)-(a).
To see 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)-(b), for any T 6= ?, any θ 2 Θ, and any
x /2 'E (θ), let x 2 M
&
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, θ
'
. Note that u (M (X, θ) ; θ) is the utility allocation
corresponding to the unanimous allocations M (X, θ) at θ, which is a unique point in the
utility possibility set U (θ). Therefore, U (θ) \ {u (M (X, θ) ; θ)} is not closed in Rn+. In this
case, there is no unanimously maximal utility allocation within U (θ) \ {u (M (X, θ) ; θ)} at
θ. Likewise, U (θ) \
h
[i2T
n
u
&
M
&
X, θ¯
i
'
; θ
'o
[ {u (M (X, θ) ; θ)}
i
is not closed, within
which there is no unanimously maximal utility allocation at θ. Then, correspondingly,
M (X\M (X, θ) , θ) = ? holds as well as M
&
X\
h
[i2TM
&
X, θ¯
i
'
[M (X, θ)
i
, θ
'
= ?
holds. Therefore, whenever there exists k 2 T such that θ¯k = θ, M
&
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, θ
'
=
M
&
X\
h
[i2TM
&
X, θ¯
i
'
[M (X, θ)
i
, θ
'
= ? holds. Note that even if M (X, θ) = ?,
M (X\M (X, θ) , θ) = M (X, θ) = ? holds. Then, since M
&
X\
h
[i2TM
&
X, θ¯
i
'i
, θ
'
=
M (X, θ) wheneverM (X, θ)\
h
[i2TM
&
X, θ¯
i
'i
= ?,M
&
X\
h
[i2TM
&
X, θ¯
i
'i
, θ
'
=M (X, θ) =
? holds. Thus, if θ¯k = θ for some k 2 T , then x 2 M
&
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, θ
'
does not hold. Thus,
in this case, 'E vacuously satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)-(b). Consider the case that for any
k 2 T , θ¯k 6= θ. Then, if x 2 M
&
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, θ
'
, then let w(h,θ) ≡ (xh,0−h) = x0h. Then,
w(h,θ) 2 YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
'
\ Ih (θ, x,X) holds, as YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
'
⊇ X0, by our specification.
Thus, 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)-(b). In summary, 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(A).
(iii) Next, let us show that 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(B). Let x 2 'E (θ), and for any
given i 2 N and any given θ0 2 Θ, let z 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, z) and z /2 'E (θ0). By the
construction of Sj (θ
0;x, θ) for each j 2 N\S, x /2 Sj (θ0;x, θ) whenever θ0 = θ. Therefore,
the premise (II) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) is never met whenever S = {i}.
Let θ0 = θ. In this case, i 2 S. Suppose the premise (I) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds for
θ
i
= θ. Then, the construction of Si (θ;x, θ) implies z = z0i holds, and so z 2 X0 ⊆ YT
&
θ
T
'
.
Moreover, there exist ` 2 N\ {i} and an outcome z0` ≡
&
z
(`)
` ,0−`
'
2 X0 ⊆ YT\{`}
&
θ
T
−`
'
such
that z0` P` (θ
0) z. Therfore, the claim (β) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds. Suppose the premise
(I) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds for θ
i 6= θ. Again, the construction of Si
&
θ
i
;x, θ
'
implies
z = z0i holds, and so z 2 X0 ⊆ YT
&
θ
T
'
. Therefore, as in the case of θ
i
= θ, the claim (β)
of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds.
Suppose that the premise (I) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) does not hold, but the premise
(II) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds. This implies that for every k 2 T , k 2 S. Then, given
the construction of Si (θ;x, θ) and the present supposition, neither the premise (1) nor the
premise (3) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds. Therefore, let i /2 H. Then, for each j 2 N\S,
there exists z0j 2 X0 ⊆ YT
&
θ
T
, θj
'
for θj = θ. By definition of z0j , z
0
j 2 Ij (θ, z,X) holds.
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Since i /2 N\S 6= ?, the claim (α) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds wheneverH\(N\S) 6= ?. If
H ⊆ S\ {i}, then it implies that for any h 2 H, z 2 Ch (θ, x) ⊆ Lh (θ, z) holds by uh (zh; θ) =
uh (xh; θ). Since 'E satisfies part (2)-(a) of Condition µ∗(ii), either z /2 \N\{i}Mj (X, θ)
or z 2 Si (θ;x, θ) holds. Note that H ⊆ S\ {i} and i 2 S imply that #S > 1. This
implies there is at least one individual k other than i such that uk (zk; θ) = uk (xk; θ).
Therefore, z 6= z0i , which implies z /2 Si (θ;x, θ), and so z /2 \N\{i}Mj (X, θ) holds. Thus,
z 2 YT (θ) = X\M (X, θ), and there exist ` 2 N\S and outcome z(`) 2 X such that
z(`)P` (θ
0) z. Therefore, the claim (β) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) holds wheneverH\(N\S) = ?.
Suppose that T = ?. Then, again only the premise (2) that i /2 H is available. In this
case, z 2 X = YT
&
θ
T
'
holds, and the claim (α) of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B) always holds by
z0j 2 Ij (θ, z,X) for any j 6= i. In summary, 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(iii)-(B).
(iv) To see 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(i), let x 2 'E (θ) \'E (θ0) and C` (θ, x) ⊆ L` (θ0, x)
holds for all ` 2 N . This implies θ0 6= θ. Then, for each h 2 H, it follows that x0h 2
Sh (θ
0;x, θ)\Ih (θ0, x,X), by the definition of Sh (θ0;x, θ). Thus, 'E satisfies Condition µ∗(i).
5. Conclusion
The main practical aim of adopting an axiomatic approach to implementation theory
is to distinguish between implementable and non-implementable SCRs. Drawing from the
recent literature on implementation with partially-honest individuals, this paper identifies
necessary and su¢cient conditions for the Nash implementation in a many-person setting
with partially-honest individuals. Existing results on the subject have thus far o§ered only
su¢cient conditions in a variety of environments.
In an environment in which knowledge is dispersed, how individuals will interact with
the mechanism designer is a natural starting point when it comes to Nash implement a SCR.
A particular kind of communication is, as we have done in this paper, to ask participants
to report the entire state of the world. There is, however, no reason to restrict attention to
such schemes.
On this issue, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2016) have recently identified conditions for
Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals which, if satisfied, send us back to
the limitations imposed by Maskin’s theorem. In terms of mechanisms, these conditions
basically result in the impossibility to structure the communication in a way that does not
allow the mechanism designer to elicit enough information of individuals’ characteristics from
the partially-honest participants. For instance, the limitations of Maskin’s theorem remain
valid when participants are asked to report only their own characteristics.
However, this does not mean that there are not mechanisms that resemble real-life
mechanisms and that, at the same time, allow us to escape the limitations imposed by
Maskin monotonicity in a setting with partially-honest individuals. One of these mechanisms
is represented by the price-quantity mechanism (studied, for example, in Dutta et al. 1995;
Sjöström, 1996; and Saijo et al., 1996), in which each individual chooses prices of commodities
as well as a consumption bundle as her strategy choice. This is so because the announcement
of prices serves the purpose to acquire some local information about individuals’ indi§erence
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curves, such as the common marginal rate of substitution at an e¢cient allocation. Indeed,
we now know that the Walrasian set solution is Nash implementable in a many-person
setting with partially-honest individuals by this type of market mechanism (see Lombardi
and Yoshihara, 2017).30
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991)
have shown that Maskin’s theorem can be generalized to Bayesian environments. A neces-
sary condition for Bayesian Nash implementation is Bayesian monotonicity. In a Bayesian
environment involving at least three individuals, Bayesian monotonicity combined with no
veto-power is su¢cient for Bayesian Nash implementation provided that a necessary condi-
tion called closure and the Bayesian incentive compatibility condition are satisfied (Jackson,
1991). Korpela (2014) studies Bayesian Nash implementation and provides su¢cient condi-
tions for implementation in a setting with partially-honest participants. This characteriza-
tion result shows that Bayesian monotonicity becomes redundant in this environment, and
so there are far fewer limitations for Bayesian Nash implementation when individuals have
a taste for honesty. As yet, where the exact boundaries of those limitations lay for Bayesian
environments is far from known. This subject is left for future research.
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6. Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Let the premises hold. Suppose that SCR F : Θ! X satisfies unanimity.
Let us first show that F satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X if it is partially-
honestly Nash implemented by the mechanism Γ = (M, g). Let Γ be the mechanism that
partially-honestly Nash implements F . Then, T Γi
$
θ¯
% 6= ? for every pair $i, θ¯% 2 N ×Θ and,
moreover, it holds that
F
$
θ¯
%
= NA
&
Γ,<Γ,θ¯,H¯
'
, for every pair
$
θ¯, H¯
% 2 Θ×H.
Let
Y = {z 2 X|g (m) = z for some m 2M}.
Thus, Y contains the range of F .
For what follows, fix any pair (x, θ) 2 Y ×Θ with x 2 F (θ).
Given that N 2 H by Assumption 2, there exists m such that g (m) = x and that
m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,N%. Thus, for every i 2 N , let
Ci (θ, x) = g (Mi,m−i) . (A1)
Clearly, x 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x) and Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Y . For what follows, fix also any pair
(θ0, H) 2 Θ×H.
Given that g (m) = x and m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,N%, define Si (θ0;x, θ) as follows:
Si (θ
0;x, θ) = g
$
T Γi (θ
0) ,m−i
%
. (A2)
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Clearly, Si (θ
0;x, θ) 6= ? and, moreover, Si (θ0;x, θ) ⊆ Ci (θ, x), establishing part (1)(a) of
Condition µ∗(ii).
Next, we show that F satisfies part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii). Take any h 2 H and
suppose that θ0 = θ. Also, suppose that x /2 Sh (θ0;x, θ). It follows that mh /2 T Γh (θ).
Suppose that there exists z 2 Sh (θ0;x, θ) such that zRh (θ0) x. Given that z 2 Sh (θ0;x, θ), it
follows that there exists m0h 2 T Γ (θ) such that g (m0h,m−h) = z. Thus, (m0h,m−h) ≻Γ,θh m,
which contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,N%. We thus conclude that xPh (θ) z for all z 2
Sh (θ;x, θ).
Finally, we show that F satisfies part (2) of Condition µ∗(ii). Fix any pair (i, y) 2 N ×
Ci (θ, x). Then, given that g (m) = x and m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,N
%
, it follows that (m0i,m−i) = y
for some m0i 2Mi. To economize on notation, we write m0 for (m0i,m−i).
Suppose that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, y) and that Y ⊆ Li (θ0, y). Moreover, suppose that
y /2 F (θ0). By the partially-honest Nash implementability of F , we have that m0 /2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ0,H
%
. Given that g (Mk,m0k) ⊆ Lk (θ0, y) for every k 2 N , there is a deviant
partially-honest individual h 2 H who can find it profitable unilaterally to deviate from
m0. Thus, it is the case that m0h /2 T Γh (θ0) and that there is m00h 2 T Γh (θ0) such that
g
$
T Γh (θ
0) ,m0−h
% \ Ih (θ0, y, Y ) 6= ?. This shows that the intersection
Si (θ
0;x, θ)
\
Ii (θ
0, y, Y ) (A3)
is not empty ifH = {i}. Suppose thatH = {i}. If g $m00i ,m0−i% = y, then y 2 NA $Γ,<Γ,θ0,H%,
which contradicts that y /2 F (θ0). Thus, when H = {i}, we have that y /2 Si (θ0;x, θ) and
that the intersection in (A3) is not empty, establishing part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii).
Finally, let us show that F satisfies part (2)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) as well. Thus, suppose
that the deviant h identified above is di§erent from i given that i /2 H and, moreover, that
θ0 = θ. Recall that for this deviant individual it holds that m0h = mh /2 T Γh (θ0). Since
g (m) = x and m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, it holds that the deviant individual h cannot break it
via any unilateral deviation.31
Assume, to the contrary, that x 2 Sj (θ0;x, θ) for all j 2 H. Then, the deviant individual
h 2 H identified above can find a strategy choice mˆh 2 T Γh (θ0) such that g (mˆh,m−h) = x.
Since m0h = mh /2 T Γh (θ0), it follows that mˆh 6= mh and so the deviant individual h can break
the strategy profile m from being a Nash equilibrium of
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, which is a contradiction.
Thus, it is the case that x /2 Sj (θ0;x, , θ) for some individual j 2 H, establishing part (2)(b)
of Condition µ∗(ii).
In what follows, we show that F is partially-honestly Nash implementable if it satisfies
Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X. To this end, suppose that F satisfies Condition
µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X.
Agent i’s strategy choice space is defined by
Mi = (Θ [ Ω)×X ×N ,
where Ω is a non-empty set such that its intersection with Θ is empty and that there is
a bijection φ from Θ to Ω. Thus, individual i’s strategy consists of an outcome in X, an
31Observe that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% given that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,N% and that H ⊆ N .
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element of the set Θ [ Ω and an individual index k 2 N . A typical strategy played by
individual i is denoted by mi = (mi1, x
i, ki) with mi1 as a typical element of Θ [ Ω. The
strategy choice space of individuals is the product space M =
Q
i2N
Mi, with m as a typical
strategy profile.
For every pair
$
θ¯, x
% 2 Θ × Y with x 2 F $θ¯%, define individual p’s set σp $θ¯, x% as
follows:
σp
$
θ¯, x
%
=
8<:
(
φ
$
θ¯
%)× {x}×N if for one and only one individual q
it holds that x 2 Sq
$
θ¯;x, θ¯
%
and q 6= p;(
θ¯
)× {x}×N otherwise.
Write σ
$
θ¯, x
%
for a typical profile of sets, that is, σ
$
θ¯, x
%
=
$
σp
$
θ¯, x
%%
p2N ; and write σ
p
1
$
θ¯, x
%
for a typical first coordinate of the set σp
$
θ¯, x
%
.
Definition 15 For every pair
$
θ¯, x
% 2 Θ × Y with x 2 F $θ¯% and every strategy profile
m 2M ,
(a) m is consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
if mi 2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
for every individual i 2 N .
(b) m is quasi-consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
if mi /2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
for one and only one individual i 2 N .
The outcome function g is defined by the following three rules:
Rule 1: If m is consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
, then g (m) = x.
Rule 2: If m is quasi-consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
and mi /2 σi (θ, x) for some i 2 N , then we can
have three cases:
1. If mi1 = θ
i = θ¯ or mi1 = φ
$
θi
%
= φ
$
θ¯
%
, then g (m) = x.
2. Ifmi1 = θ
i 6= θ¯ ormi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ $θ¯%, then given that θi = $φ−1 ◦ φ% $θi%: (a) g (m) = xi
if xi 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
; (b) g (m) = xi if xi 2 Ci
$
θi, x
% \Si $θi;x, θ¯% and Si $θi;x, θ¯% ⊆
SLi
$
θi, xi
%
; (c) g (m) = y if xi 2 Ci
$
θ¯, x
% \Si $θi;x, θ¯% and y 2 Si $θi;x, θ¯%\Ii $θi, xi, Y %;
(d) otherwise, g (m) = z for some z 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
.
3. If mi1 = θ
i = θ¯ 6= σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
, then: (a) g (m) = xi if xi 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
; (b) otherwise,
g (m) = z for some z 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
.
Rule 3: Otherwise, a modulo game is played: divide the sum
P
i2N k
i by n and identify the
remainder, which can be either 0, 1, · · · , or n − 1. The individual having the same index
of the remainder is declared the winner of the game and the alternative implemented is the
one she selects, with the convention that the winner is individual n if the remainder is 0.
By the above definitions, it follows that Γ = (M, g) is a mechanism. We show that this
Γ partially-honestly implements F .
For every individual i, define the truth-telling correspondence as follows:
T Γi
$
θ¯
%
=
(
θ¯
)×X ×N , for every state θ¯ 2 Θ.
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It is clear that the truth-telling correspondence is not empty, as required by Definition 4.
Thus, we are left to show that
F
$
θ¯
%
= NA
&
Γ,<Γ,θ¯,H¯
'
, for every pair
$
θ¯, H¯
% 2 Θ×H.
To this end, fix any pair (θ, H) 2 Θ×H.
Let us first show that if x 2 F (θ), then there is a strategy profile m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%
with g (m) = x.
Suppose that x 2 F (θ). Given that the profile σ (θ, x) is well-defined, take any strategy
profile m that is consistent with σ (θ, x). Thus, m falls into Rule 1 and x = g (m). We claim
that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
To see this, first observe that any deviation of j will get her to an outcome in Cj (θ, x)
by Rule 2, and so g (Mj,m−j) ⊆ Cj (θ, x). Since Cj (θ, x) ⊆ Lj (θ, x), such deviations are
not profitable if j /2 H. To see that such deviations are also not profitable for j 2 H, we
proceed according to whether σj1 (θ, x) = {θ} or not.
Suppose that σj1 (θ, x) = {θ}. Then, given that mj 2 T Γj (θ), there is no unilateral
profitable deviation for this j 2 H. Suppose that σj1 (θ, x) = {φ (θ)}. Then, mj /2 T Γj (θ),
and, moreover, x /2 Sj (θ;x, θ), by definition of σj (θ, x). Note that by definition of Rule
2.3 any deviation to a truthful strategy choice for θ by this j will result in outcomes of
Sj (θ;x, θ). Since part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies that Sj (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLj (θ, x), there
is no unilateral profitable deviation for this j.
In summary, j’s deviations from m are not profitable, and so m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, as
we sought
For the converse, suppose that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. We show that g (m) 2 F (θ). To
obtain a contradiction, we suppose that g (m) /2 F (θ). We proceed by cases.
Case 1 : m falls into Rule 3
Given the richness of the strategy space we see that X ⊆ g (Mj,m−j) for every j. Since
m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, it follows that X ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j. Given that the SCR F is
unanimous, g (m) 2 F (θ), which is a contradiction.
Case 2 : m falls into Rule 1
Then, g (m) = x. If θ = θ¯, there is an immediate contradiction. We thus suppose
that θ 6= θ¯. It follows that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for every h 2 H. Fix any h 2 H. This h can
change mh into m0h =
$
θ, x, kh
% 2 T Γh (θ) so as to induce Rule 2.2 and to obtain an outcome
g (m0h,m−h) such that g (m
0
h,m−h) Ih (θ) x. Therefore, (m
0
h,m−h) ≻Γ,θh m, which contradicts
that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
Case 3 : m falls into Rule 2.1
Then, g (m) = x. Again, if θ = θ¯, there is an immediate contradiction. We thus suppose
that θ 6= θ¯. Therefore, we have that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for every h 2 H. Fix any h 2 H. Suppose
that h = i. This i can change mi into m0i = (θ, x, k
i) 2 T Γi (R) so as to induce Rule 2.2
and to obtain g (m0i,m−i) such that g (m
0
i,m−i) Ii (θ) x. Therefore, (m
0
i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which
contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. Thus, suppose that h 6= i. This h can change mh into
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m0h =
$
θ, x, kh
% 2 T Γh (R) so as to induce Rule 3. To attain x, h has only to adjust kh so as to
win the modulo game. Thus, (m0h,m−h) ≻Γ,θh m, which contradicts thatm 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
.
Case 4 : m falls into Rule 2.3
Then, g (m) 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
. Given that in this case it must hold that mi /2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
and
that mi1 = θ
i = θ¯ 6= σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
, it follows from the definition of the profile σ
$
θ¯, x
%
and the
fact that m falls into Rule 2.3 that x 2 Sq
$
θ¯;x, θ¯
%
for one and only one individual q 6= i,32
and so g (m) 6= x. We proceed according to whether θ = θ¯ or not.
Sub-case 4.1 : θ = θi = θ¯
Observe that x /2 Si (θ;x, θ) given that θ¯ 6= σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
. Suppose that i 2 H. Given
that i can attain x by inducing Rule 1, we have that x 2 g (Mi,m−i). Given that m 2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, it also holds that g (m)Ri (θ) x. However, since x 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x)
and, moreover, g (m) 2 Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ Ci (θ, x), it follows that xIi (θ) g (m), which contradicts
part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii). Therefore, it must be the case that i /2 H.
Suppose that H\ {q} 6= ?. Then, take any h 2 H\ {q}. Note that mh /2 T Γh (θ) given
that σh1 (θ, x) = {φ (θ)}. This h can change mh into m0h =
$
θ, g (m) , kh
% 2 T Γh (θ) so as to
induce Rule 3. To attain g (m), h has only to adjust kh so as to win the modulo game. Thus,
(m0h,m−h) ≻Γ,θh m, which contradicts that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. Otherwise, let H\ {q} = ?.
Given that H 6= ? and that i /2 H, we are left to consider the case where H = {q}. Recall
that x 2 Sq (θ;x, θ) for one and only one individual q 6= i.
Let us show that Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j 6= i. To this end, take any z 2 Y \ {x}
and any j 6= i. By changing mj into m0j = (φ (θ) , z, kj), j can induce Rule 3. To attain z,
this j has only to adjust kj so as to win the modulo game. To attain x, j has only to adjust
kj so as to allow k 2 N\ {i, j} to win the modulo game. Thus, we have that Y ⊆ g (Mj,m−j)
and so Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) given that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, as was to be shown.
Next, let us show that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)). To attain x, i can change mi into any
strategy choice in σi (θ, x) and induce Rule 1. Thus, x 2 g (Mi,m−i). Since g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x)
and Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x) and, moreover, since m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, we see that xIi (θ) g (m).
By transitivity, it follows from Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x) that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)).
Since Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j 6= i and Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)) and since, moreover,
H = {q} and g (m) /2 F (θ), part (2)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies that x /2 Sq (θ;x, θ),
which is a contradiction.
Sub-case 4.2 : θ 6= θi = θ¯
Note that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for every h 2 H. Fix any h 2 H. Suppose that h = i.
This i can change mi into m0i = (θ, g (m) , k
i) 2 T Γi (θ) so as to induce Rule 2.2 and to
obtain g (m0i,m−i) such that g (m
0
i,m−i) Ii (θ) g (m).
33 Therefore, (m0i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which
contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. Thus, suppose that h 6= i. This h can change mh
into m0h =
$
θ, g (m) , kh
% 2 T Γh (θ) so as to induce Rule 3. To attain g (m), h has only to
adjust kh so as to win the modulo game. Thus, (m0h,m−h) ≻Γ,θh m, which contradicts that
m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
32If q = i, then σ1i
$
θ¯, x
%
=
(
θ¯
)
, which is not the case.
33Note that if g (m) /2 Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
%
and there does not exist any outcome y 2 Ci
$
θ¯, x
%
such that y 2
Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ), then by part (b) of Rule 2.2 it follows that g (m0i,m−i) = g (m).
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Case 5 : m falls into Rule 2.2
Let us show that Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j 6= i. To this end, take any z 2 Y \ {x}
and any j 6= i. By changing mj into m0j = (φ (θ) , z, kj), j can induce Rule 3. To attain z,
this j has only to adjust kj so as to win the modulo game. To attain x, j has only to adjust
kj so as to allow k 2 N\ {i, j} to win the modulo game. Thus, we have that Y ⊆ g (Mj,m−j)
and so Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) given that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. Since the choice of j is arbitrary,
we have that Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for each j 6= i.
Next, let us show that Ci
$
θ¯, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)). To attain x, i can change mi into
m0i 2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
and induce Rule 1. Thus, x 2 g (Mi,m−i). Let us proceed according to
whether θ = θ¯ or not.
Suppose that θ = θ¯. Since g (m) 2 Ci
$
θ¯, x
%
and Ci
$
θ¯, x
% ⊆ Li $θ¯, x% and, more-
over, since m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, we see that xIi (θ) g (m). By transitivity, it follows from
Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x) that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)).
Suppose thus that θ 6= θ¯. Note that g (Mi,m−i) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)) given that m 2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. By changing mi into m0i = (φ (θ) , z
i, ki) with zi 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
%
, i can in-
duce Rule 2.2 and obtain this zi via part (a) of the outcome function. It follows that i can
also attain every outcome in Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
%
, establishing that Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% [ {x} ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)).
Assume, to the contrary, that there exists w 2 Ci
$
θ¯, x
% \Si $θ;x, θ¯% such that wPi (θ) g (m).
By transitivity, we see that Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% [ {x} ⊆ SLi (θ, w). Individual i can change mi into
m0i = (φ (θ) , w, k
i) so as to obtain g (m0i,m−i) = w by part (b) of Rule 2.2, which contradicts
that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. Thus, we conclude that Ci $θ¯, x% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)).
(+) Suppose that σh1
$
θ¯, x
%
=
(
φ
$
θ¯
%)
for some h 2 H\ {i} if the set H 6= {i}. Then,
mh /2 T Γh (θ). By changing mh into m0h =
$
θ, g (m) , kh
% 2 T Γh (θ), h can induce Rule
3. To attain g (m), this h has only to adjust kh so as to win the modulo game. It
follows that (m0h,m−h) ≻Γ,θh m, which contradicts thatm 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. Therefore,
it must be the case that σh1 (θ, x) = {θ} for every h 2 H\ {i} if the set H 6= {i}.
We distinguish the following cases: (1) i /2 H, (2) H = {i} and (3) i 2 H and H \
(N\ {i}) 6= ?.
Sub-case 5.1 : i /2 H
Suppose that θ¯ 6= θ. Then, mh /2 T Γh (θ) for each h 2 H. Fix any h. The contradiction
that m /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% follows from the argument used for (+). Thus, in what follows, we
assume that θ¯ = θ. We distinguish whether x 2 Sh (θ;x, θ) for some h 2 H or not.
Suppose that x 2 Sh (θ;x, θ) for some h 2 H. Since m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
and since,
moreover, Assumption 2 holds, it follows thatm 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}%. Since g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆
Li (θ, g (m)) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j 6= i and since, moreover, x 2 Sh (θ;x, θ) and
{h} 2 H, part (2)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies that g (m) 2 F (θ), which is a contradiction.
Suppose that x /2 Sh (θ;x, θ) for every h 2 H. Since H 6= {i}, it follows from (+) that
σh1 (θ, x) = {θ} for every h 2 H. This implies that mh 2 T Γh (θ) for every h 2 H. Suppose
that x 2 Sp (θ;x, θ) for some p 2 N\H with p 6= i. Since g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m))
and Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j 6= i and since, moreover, x 2 Sp (θ;x, θ) and {p} 2 H, part
(2)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies that g (m) 2 F (θ), which is a contradiction. Therefore, we
have established that x /2 Sj (θ;x, θ) for every j 6= i. Furthermore, given thatH 6= ? and that
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i /2 H and given that mh 2 T Γh (θ) for every h 2 H, it cannot be that x 2 Sq (θ;x, θ) for one
and only one individual q = i. It follows that x /2 Si (θ;x, θ). By Assumption 2, it also holds
that {i} 2 H. Since θ¯ = θ, part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies that Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ, x)
for i when {i} 2 H is considered. Now, since g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x) and since x 2
Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)), it follows that xIi (θ) g (m), and so Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)), by
transitivity. However, since g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every
j 6= i and since, moreover, {i} 2 H and g (m) /2 F (θ), part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies
that Si (θ;x, θ) \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ) 6= ?, which contradicts that Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)).
Sub-case 5.2 : H = {i}
Then, mi 2 T Γi (θ). To see this, assume, to the contrary, that mi /2 T Γi (θ). We proceed
according to whether σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
= {θ} or not.
Suppose that σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
= {θ}. Then, θ = θ¯. To attain x, i can change mi into m0i =
(θ, x, ki) 2 T Γi (θ) and induce Rule 1. Since H = {i}, it follows that (m0i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which
contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
Suppose that σi1
$
θ¯, x
% 6= {θ}. We proceed according to whether θ = θ¯ or not. Suppose
that θ 6= θ¯. Then, by changing mi into m0i = (θ, g (m) , ki) 2 T Γi (θ), i can induce Rule
2.2. Since g (m0i,m−i) Ii (θ) g (m), it follows that (m
0
i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which contradicts that
m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. Suppose that θ = θ¯. Then, σi1 $θ¯, x% = (φ $θ¯%) given that σi1 $θ¯, x% 6=
{θ}, and so it must be the case that x 2 Sq
$
θ¯;x, θ
%
for one and only one individual q 6= i
and, consequently, that σp1
$
θ¯, x
%
=
(
φ
$
θ¯
%)
for every p 6= q.34 Since g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆
Li (θ, g (m)) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j 6= i and since, moreover, g (m) /2 F (θ), part
(2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies for {i} = H that g (m) /2 Si (θ;x, θ) and that there is
z 2 Si (θ;x, θ) \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ). Thus, by changing mi into m0i = (θ, z, ki) 2 T Γi (θ), i can
induce Rule 2.3 and obtain g (m0i,m−i) = z, which contradicts that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
.
We conclude that mi 2 T Γi (θ).
Since g (m) 2 Ci
$
θ¯, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)) and Y ⊆ Lj (θ, g (m)) for every j 6= i and since,
moreover, either g (m) 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
%
or Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)), part (2)(a) of Condition
µ∗(ii) implies that g (m) 2 F (θ), which is a contradiction.
Sub-case 5.3 : i 2 H and H \ (N\ {i}) 6= ?
Then, from the same arguments used for Sub-case 5.1, one can see that θ¯ = θ. It also
follows from (+) that σh1 (θ, x) = θ for every h 2 H\ {i}, and so mh 2 T Γh (θ) for every
h 2 H\ {i}. Note that mi /2 T Γi (θ) given that mi1 = θi 6= θ or mi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ (θ). Also,
note that given that g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x) and that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)) we have
that g (m) Ii (θ) x. We proceed according to whether σi1 (θ, x) = θ or not.
Suppose that σi1 (θ, x) = θ. Then, by changing mi into m
0
i = (θ, x, k
i) 2 T Γi (θ), i
can induce Rule 1 and obtain g (m0i,m−i) = x. Given that g (m) Ii (θ) x, it follows that
(m0i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which contradicts that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
.
Suppose that σi1 (θ, x) 6= θ. Thus, σi1 (θ, x) = φ (θ), and so there exists exactly one q 6= i
such that x 2 Sq (θ;x, θ) and, consequently, σp1 (θ, x) = φ (θ) for every p 6= q. Given that
i 2 H and H \ (N\ {i}) 6= ? and given that mh 2 T Γh (θ) for every h 2 H\ {i}, it needs to
be the case that H = {q, i}.
34Again, if q = i, then σ1i
$
θ¯, x
%
=
(
θ¯
)
, which is not the case.
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Part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies that Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ, x). Furthermore, given
that g (m) Ii (θ) x, it also follows from transitivity that Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)). Sincem 2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, and since, moreover, Assumption 2 holds, m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{i}%. Since the
premises of part (2)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii) are met, we have that Si (θ;x, θ)\Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ) 6=
?, which is a contradiction.
6.2 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3, "if" part
Let the premises hold. Let F : Θ ! X be a SCR. In what follows, we show that F is
partially-honestly Nash implementable if it satisfies Condition µ∗. To this end, suppose that
F satisfies Condition µ∗ with respect to Y ⊆ X with F (Θ) ⊆ Y .
Let us define a mechanism Γ = (M, g). First, individual i’s strategy choice space is
defined by:
Mi = (Θ [ Ω)× Y ×N ×N ,
where Ω is a non-empty set such that its intersection with Θ is empty and that there is
a bijection φ from Θ to Ω. Thus, individual i’s strategy consists of an outcome in X, an
element of the set Θ[Ω and a pair of individual indices in N ×N . A typical strategy played
by individual i is denoted by mi = (mi1, x
i, ki, zi) with mi1 as a typical element of Θ[Ω. The
strategy choice space of individuals is the product space M =
Q
i2N
Mi, with m as a typical
strategy profile.
For every individual i, define the truth-telling correspondence as follows:
T Γi
$
θ¯
%
=
(
θ¯
)× Y ×N ×N , for every state θ¯ 2 Θ.
It is clear that the truth-telling correspondence is not empty for every individual i, as required
by Definition 4.
For every strategy choice profile m 2M , define the sets of individuals T (m) as follows:
T (m) =
(
i 2 N |mi 2 T Γi
$
θi
%
for some θi 2 Θ) (A4)
Thus, if the strategy choicemi of individual i is truthful for some state θ
i, then this individual
is an element of the set T (m).
For every pair
$
θ¯, x
% 2 Θ × Y with x 2 F $θ¯%, define individual p’s set σp $θ¯, x% as
follows:
σp
$
θ¯, x
%
=
. (
θ¯
)× {x}× {1}× {1} if x 2 Sp $θ¯;x, θ¯% ;(
φ
$
θ¯
%)× {x}× {1}× {1} otherwise.
Write σ
$
θ¯, x
%
for a typical profile of sets, that is, σ
$
θ¯, x
%
=
$
σp
$
θ¯, x
%%
p2N ; and write σ
p
1
$
θ¯, x
%
for a typical first coordinate of the set σp
$
θ¯, x
%
.
Definition 16 For every pair
$
θ¯, x
% 2 Θ × Y with x 2 F $θ¯% and every strategy profile
m 2M ,
(a) m is consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
if mi 2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
for every individual i 2 N .
(b) m is quasi-consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
if mi /2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
for one and only one individual i 2 N .
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The outcome function g is defined by the following three rules:
Rule 1: If m is consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
, then g (m) = x.
Rule 2: If m is quasi-consistent with σ
$
θ¯, x
%
and mi /2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
for some i 2 N , then we can
have three cases:
1. If mi1 = θ
i = θ¯ or mi1 = φ
$
θi
%
= φ
$
θ¯
%
, then g (m) = x.
2. If mi1 = θ
i 6= θ¯ or mi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ $θ¯%, then
g (m) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
xi if xi 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ
%
;
xi
if xi 2 Ci
$
θ, x
% \Si $θi;x, θ% , Si $θi;x, θ% ⊆ SLi $θi, xi% ,
and mi 2
(
φ
$
θi
%)× {xi}×N ×N ;
y
if xi 2 Ci
$
θ, x
% \Si $θi;x, θ% ,
and 9y 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ
% \ Ii $θi, xi, Y % ;
z 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ
%
otherwise.
3. If mi1 = θ
i = θ¯ 6= σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
, then: (a) g (m) = xi if xi 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
; (b) otherwise,
g (m) = z for some z 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
.
Rule 3: Otherwise, a modulo game is played: divide the sum
P
i2N k
i by n and identify the
remainder, which can be either 0, 1, · · · , or n− 1.35 The individual having the same index
of the remainder is declared the winner of the game such that n is the winner when the
remainder is 0. If individual i wins the modulo game, then we can have two cases:
1. If the set T (m) is not empty, then: (a) g (m) = xi if xi 2 YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
; (b) otherwise,
g (m) = z for some z 2 YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
.
2. If the set T (m) is empty, then g (m) = xi.
By the above definitions, it follows that Γ = (M, g) is a mechanism. We show that this
Γ partially-honestly implements F . Thus, we are left to show that
F
$
θ¯
%
= NA
&
Γ,<Γ,θ¯,H¯
'
for every pair
$
θ¯, H¯
% 2 Θ×H.
To this end, fix any pair (θ, H) 2 Θ×H.
35Note that only the first entry of the pair (ki, zi) 2 N × N is considered in order to compute the sumP
i2N k
i.
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The proof of the assertion that if x 2 F (θ), then there exists a strategy profile m such
that g (m) = x and that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% can be found in the proof of Theorem 1 -
Appendix A.
For the converse, suppose that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. We show that g (m) 2 F (θ). To
obtain a contradiction, we suppose that g (m) /2 F (θ). We proceed by cases.
Case 1 : m falls into Rule 1
Then, g (m) = x. Note that θ 6= θ given that x 2 F $θ¯% \F (θ). So, mh /2 T Γh (θ)
for all h 2 H. Fix any i 2 N . We first show that Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)). Take any
xi 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ
%
such that xi 6= x. This i can change mi into m0i = (θ, xi, 1, 1) so as to
obtain g (m0i,m−i) = x
i, by Rule 2.2. Therefore, Si
$
θ;x, θ
% [ {x} ⊆ g (Mi,m−i), and so
Si
$
θ;x, θ
% [ {x} ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)), given that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. Suppose that there ex-
ists xi 2 Ci
$
θ, x
% \Si $θ;x, θ% such that xiPi (θ) g (m). By transitivity, Si $θ;x, θ% [ {x} ⊆
SLi (θ, x
i). Then, i can change mi into m0i = (φ (θ) , x
i, 1, 1) so as to obtain g (m0i,m−i) = x
i,
by Rule 2.2, which contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. Since the choice of i is arbitrary,
we have that Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)) for all i.
Since g (m) = x /2 F (θ), Condition µ∗(i) implies that there exist h 2 H and z(h) 2
Sh
$
θ;x, θ
% \ Ih (θ, x, Y ). Then, by Rule 2.2 of the mechanism, g (m0h,m−h) = z(h) holds
when this h changes mh into m0h =
$
θ, z(h), 1, 1
% 2 T Γh (θ), which contradicts the assumption
that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
Case 2 : m falls into Rule 2.1
Then, g (m) = x. Note that θ 6= θ given that x 2 F $θ¯% \F (θ). So, mh /2 T Γh (θ) for all
h 2 H. By the same reasoning used for Case 1, one can see that Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)).
Note that x 2 Sk
$
θ¯;x, θ¯
%
for each k 2 T (m) \ {i}, by definition of σk
$
θ¯, x
%
and by
definition of T (m) given in (A4), if T (m) \ {i} 6= ?. Thus, property (II) of Condition
µ∗(iii)(B) is met if T (m) \ {i} 6= ?. Also, note that this property is vacuously satisfied when
T (m) \ {i} = ?. Therefore, in what follows, we will assume that this property of Condition
µ∗(iii)(B) is met.
Note that if i 2 T (m), then mi1 = θi = θ¯, by definition of Rule 2.1 and by definition of
T (m) given in (A4). Also, note that σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
= θ¯ if i 2 T (m); otherwise, if σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
= φ
$
θ¯
%
and i 2 T (m), then m would fall into Rule 2.3, which is not the case. Thus, x = g (m) 2
Si
$
θ¯;x, θ¯
%
if i 2 T (m). This implies that property (I) of Condition µ∗(iii)(B) is met if
i 2 T (m). Also, note that this property is vacuously satisfied when i /2 T (m). Therefore,
in what follows, we will assume that this property of Condition µ∗(iii)(B) is met as well.
Given that both property (I) and property (II) are satisfied, Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies
that g (m) 2 YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
. Recall that YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
= Y if T (m) = ?, by Condition
µ∗(iii)(A)(0).
We proceed according to whether i 2 H or not.
Sub-case 2.1 : i 2 H
Given that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% and that i can induce Rule 2.2 by changing mi /2
T Γi (θ) into m
0
i 2 T Γi (θ), because θ 6= θ¯, it does not exist any xi 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ
%
such that
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xiRi (θ) g (m). Thus, Si
$
θ;x, θ
% ⊆ SLi (θ, x). We proceed according to whether mi1 = θi = θ¯
or mi1 = φ
$
θi
%
= φ
$
θ¯
%
.
Sub—sub-case 2.1.1 : mi1 = φ
$
θi
%
= φ
$
θ¯
%
Then, i /2 T (m), by definition of T (m) given in (A4). Suppose that T (m) \ {i} 6= ?.
Since Si
$
θ;x, θ
% ⊆ SLi (θ, x) and T (m) \ {i} 6= ?, Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies that either
statement (α) or statement (β) holds.
Case α: Statement (α) of Condition µ∗(iii)(B) holds.
Then, there exists an h 2 H\ {i} who can changemh /2 T Γh (θ) intom0h =
$
θ, z(h), kh, 2
% 2
T Γh (θ) so as to induce Rule 3. To obtain z
(h) 2 YT(m−h,m0h)
&
θT(m−h,m
0
h)
'
\ Ih (θ, x, Y ), h has
only to adjust kh by which she becomes the winner of the modulo game, which contradicts
that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
Case β: Statement (β) of Condition µ∗(iii)(B) holds.
Then, there exists an ` 2 N\ {i} who can change m` into m0` =
$
φ (θ) , z(`), k`, 2
%
so
as to induce Rule 3. To obtain z(`) 2 YT(m−h,m0h)
&
θT(m−h,m
0
h)
'
, with ` /2 T (m−h,m0h) by
definition in (A4), such that z(`)P` (θ) g (m), ` has only to adjust k` by which she becomes
the winner of the modulo game, which contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
Suppose that T (m) \ {i} = ?. Thus, T (m) = ?.
(*) Since m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% and i 2 H and since, moreover, {i} 2 H, by Assumption
2, then m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{i}%. Note that every ` 6= i can induce Rule 3.2 and win
the modulo game. Since m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{i}%, we see that Y ⊆ L` (θ, g (m)) for each
` 6= i. Then, since Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)) and {i} 2 H, and since, moreover,
Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)), Condition µ∗(ii)(2)(a) implies that g (m) 2 F (θ), which is a
contradiction.
Sub—sub-case 2.1.2 : mi1 = θ
i = θ¯
Then, i 2 T (m). Since Si
$
θ;x, θ
% ⊆ SLi (θ, x) and T (m) 6= ?, Condition µ∗(iii)(B)
implies that either statement (α) or statement (β) holds. The contradiction that m /2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
follows either from the argument used for Case α or from the argument used
for Case β.
Sub-case 2.2 : i /2 H
Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies that either statement (α) or statement (β) holds. Let us
proceed according to whether T (m) 6= ? or not. Suppose that T (m) 6= ?. The contradiction
that m /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% follows either from the argument used for Case α or from the
argument used for Case β. Therefore, let us suppose that T (m) = ?.
(**) Then, every ` 6= i can induce Rule 3.2 and win the modulo game. Since m 2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, we see that Y ⊆ L` (θ, g (m)) for each ` 6= i. It follows that only
statement (α) of Condition µ∗(iii)(B) can hold. Thus, the same type of argument used
for Case α shows that m /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, which is a contradiction.
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Case 3 : m corresponds to Rule 2.2
We first show that Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)). Note that i can induce Rule 1 and obtain
x. Also, note that g (m)Ri (θ) x given that g (m) 2 NA
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. We proceed according
to whether θ = θ or not. Suppose that θ = θ. Then, given that x 2 F (θ), Condition µ∗(ii)
implies that Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li $θ, x%, and so xIi $θ% g (m), given that g (m) 2 Ci $θ, x%. Assume,
to the contrary, that there exists xi 2 Ci
$
θ, x
%
such that xiPi
$
θ
%
g (m). By transitivity,
xiPi
$
θ
%
x, which contradicts that Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li $θ, x%. Suppose that θ 6= θ. By same the
reasoning used in Case 1, one can obtain that Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)).
By the same type of argument used for Case 2, one can see that property (II) of Con-
dition µ∗(iii)(B) is satisfied. In what follows, we assume that this property is met. By
definition of g for the case of Rule 2.2, one can see that g (m) 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
if i 2 T (m).36
Thus, in what follows, we assume that property (I) of Condition µ∗(iii)(B) is satisfied as
well. Given that both property (I) and property (II) are satisfied, Condition µ∗(iii)(B) im-
plies that g (m) 2 YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
. Recall that YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
= Y if T (m) = ?, by Condition
µ∗(iii)(A)(0).
We proceed according to whether i 2 H or not.
Sub-case 3.1 : i /2 H
Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies that either statement (α) or statement (β) holds. Note that
if statement (α) should hold in the case where θ¯ = θ, then the deviant h 2 H\ {i} of Case
α is such that h /2 T (m); otherwise, Condition µ∗(iii)(B) is violated. Consequently, in the
case where θ¯ = θ, it holds that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for the deviant h 2 H\ {i} of Case α. Also,
note that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for all h 2 H\ {i} if θ 6= θ. Thus, in either case, mh /2 T Γh (θ) for the
deviant h 2 H\ {i} of Case α.
Let us proceed according to whether T (m) = ? or not. The contradiction that m /2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
follows from the argument used for Sub-case 2.2.
Sub-case 3.2 : i 2 H
We proceed according to whether θ 6= θ or not.
Sub-sub-case 3.2.1 : θ 6= θ
First, observe that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for all h 2 H\ {i}. Second, observe that mi 2 T Γi (θ) or
Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ) = ?. To see it, suppose that mi /2 T Γi (θ) and that there exists
z 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ). Then, i can change mi /2 T Γi (θ) into m0i = (θ, z, 2, 2) 2
T Γi (θ). Since θ 6= θ, and so m0i /2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
, the profile (m−i,m0i) falls into Rule 2.2. Since
z 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
%
, Rule 2.2 implies that g (m−i,m0i) = z. It follows that (m
0
i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m,
which contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%.
Suppose that mi 2 T Γi (θ), and so θi = θ and i 2 T (m). Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies
that either statement (α) or statement (β) holds. The contradiction thatm /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%
follows either from the argument used for Case α or from the argument used for Case β.
Suppose that Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ) = ? and that mi /2 T Γi (θ). This implies that
Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)), given that Si $θ;x, θ¯% ⊆ Ci $θ¯, x%, by part (1)(a) of Condition
µ∗(ii), and that Ci
$
θ¯, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)).
36By definition of T (m) given in (A4), mi1 = θ
i if i 2 T (m).
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Let us proceed according to whether mi1 = θ
i 6= θ¯ or mi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ $θ¯%.
Case  : mi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ $θ¯%
Then, i /2 T (m). Suppose that T (m) 6= ?. Since Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)) and
T (m) 6= ?, Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies that either statement (α) or statement (β) holds.
The contradiction that m /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% follows either from the argument used for Case
α or from the argument used for Case β. Thus, suppose T (m) = ?. Then, the same type
of argument used in (*) shows that g (m) 2 F (θ), which is a contradiction.
Case δ: mi1 = θ
i 6= θ¯.
So, i 2 T (m). Since Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)) and T (m) 6= ?, Condition µ∗(iii)(B)
implies that either statement (α) or statement (β) holds. The contradiction follows as before,
considering only the case T (m) 6= ? in the argument of Case  .
Sub-sub-case 3.2.2 : θ = θ
Then, given that either mi1 = θ
i 6= θ¯ or mi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ $θ¯%, by definition of Rule
2.2, mi /2 T Γi (θ). Moreover, given that x 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x), by Condition µ∗(ii), given
that g (m) 2 Ci (θ, x), by definition of Rule 2.2, and given that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)), it
follows that g (m) Ii (θ) x. Suppose that x 2 Si (θ;x, θ), so that σi1 (θ, x) = θ. Given that
mi /2 T Γi (θ) and given that i 2 H, i can change mi /2 T Γi (θ) into m0i = (θ, x, 1, 1) 2 T Γi (θ).
The profile (m−i,m0i) falls into Rule 1, and so g (m−i,m
0
i) = x. Thus, (m
0
i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m,
which contradicts that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%. We conclude that x /2 Si (θ;x, θ). Since i 2 H,
part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii) implies that Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ, x). Since g (m) Ii (θ) x and
since, moreover, Ri (θ) is transitive, it follows that Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)). We proceed
according to whether mi1 = θ
i 6= θ or mi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ (θ).
Suppose that mi1 = φ
$
θi
% 6= φ (θ). The contradiction follows from arguments similar to
those used for Case  . Otherwise, suppose thatmi1 = θ
i 6= θ. The contradiction follows from
arguments similar to those used for Case δ. Note that if statement (α) should hold, then
the deviant h 2 H\ {i} of Case α is such that h /2 T (m); otherwise, Condition µ∗(iii)(B) is
violated. Consequently, it holds that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for the deviant h 2 H\ {i} of Case α.
Case 4 : m corresponds to Rule 2.3
Then, g (m) 2 Si
$
θi;x, θ¯
%
. Given that mi1 = θ
i = θ¯ 6= σi1
$
θ¯, x
%
, it follows that x /2
Si
$
θ¯;x, θ¯
%
, by definition of σi
$
θ¯, x
%
, and so g (m) 6= x. Furthermore, Ci
$
θ, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m))
follows from the argument used for Case 3. Since x 2 Ci
$
θ, x
%
, by Condition µ∗(ii), it follows
that g (m)Ri (θ) x. We proceed according to whether θ = θ¯ = θ
i or θ 6= θ¯ = θi.
Suppose that θ = θ¯ = θi. Suppose that i 2 H. Note that x 2 g (Mi,m−i) given that i
can attain it by inducing Rule 1. Also, note that xRi (θ) g (m) given that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ, x),
by Condition µ∗(ii), given that Si (θ;x, θ) ⊆ Ci (θ, x), by part (1)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii), and
given that g (m) 2 Si (θ;x, θ). Thus, since g (m)Ri (θ) x, we have that g (m) Ii (θ) x, which
contradicts part (1)(b) of Condition µ∗(ii), given that i 2 H and that x /2 Si (θ;x, θ).
We conclude that i /2 H, and so Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies that either statement (α)
or statement (β) holds. Let us proceed according to whether T (m) 6= ? or not. The
contradiction that m /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% follows from arguments similar to those used for
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Sub-case 2.2, noting that statement (α) implies that the deviant h 2 H\ {i} is such that
h /2 T (m), given that θ = θ¯, and so mh /2 T Γh (θ).
Suppose that θ 6= θi = θ¯. Note that i 2 T (m) and that mh /2 T Γh (θ) for all h 2 H. We
proceed according to whether i 2 H or not.
Sub-case 4.1 : i 2 H
Let us show that Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ) = ?. Assume, to the contrary, that
there exists z 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ). Then, i can change mi /2 T Γi (θ) into m0i =
(θ, z, 2, 2) 2 T Γi (θ). Since θ 6= θ, and so m0i /2 σi
$
θ¯, x
%
, the profile (m−i,m0i) falls into
Rule 2.2. Moreover, since z 2 Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
%
, Rule 2.2 implies that g (m−i,m0i) = z. It follows
that (m0i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which contradicts that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
. We conclude that
Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% \ Ii (θ, g (m) , Y ) = ?.
This implies that Si
$
θ;x, θ¯
% ⊆ SLi (θ, g (m)), given that Si $θ;x, θ¯% ⊆ Ci $θ¯, x%, by
part (1)(a) of Condition µ∗(ii), and that Ci
$
θ¯, x
% ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)). Since Si $θ;x, θ% ⊆
SLi (θ, g (m)) and i 2 T (m), Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies that either statement (α) or
statement (β) holds. The contradiction that m /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% follows either from the
argument used for Case α or from the argument used for Case β.
Sub-case 4.2 : i /2 H
Condition µ∗(iii)(B) implies that either statement (α) or statement (β) holds. Let us
proceed according to whether T (m) 6= ? or not. The contradiction thatm /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%
follows from the argument used for Sub-case 2.2.
Case 5 : m falls into Rule 3.2
Then, T (m) = ?, and somh /2 T Γh (θ) for every h 2 H. Take any i 2 N and any xi 2 Y .
Let us consider m0i = (φ (θ) , x
i, ki, 2). We proceed according to whether xi 2 F (θ) or not.
Suppose that xi 2 F (θ). Then, m0i /2 σi (θ, xi), by definition of σi (θ, xi). Moreover,
given that m falls into Rule 3, mj /2 σj (θ, xi) for some j 6= i, and so (m0i,m−i) falls into Rule
3.2. To obtain xi, i has only to adjust ki by which she becomes the winner of the modulo
game. Otherwise, suppose xi /2 F (θ). Then, (m0i,m−i) falls into Rule 3.2. To obtain xi, i
has only to adjust ki by which she becomes the winner of the modulo game.
Since the choice of xi 2 Y is arbitrary, one can see that Y ⊆ g (Mi,m−i). Moreover,
given that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, it holds that Y ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)). Since the choice of i is
arbitrary, one can see that g (m) 2M (Y, θ) \F (θ).
Given thatm 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, it follows from Assumption 2 thatm 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}%
for every h 2 H. Thus, in what follows, fix any h 2 H. Since g (m) 2 M (Y, θ) \F (θ),
Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)-(a) implies for {h} that g (m) /2 Yh (θ), given that T (m) = ?, and
that there exists z(h,θ) 2 Yh (θ) \ Ih (θ, g (m) , Y ). By changing mh /2 T Γh (θ) into m0h =$
θ, z(h,θ), kh, 2
% 2 T Γh (θ), h can induce Rule 3.1 with T (m0h,m−h) = {h}. To see this, note
in the case where z(h,θ) 2 F (θ) it holds that m0h /2 σh
$
θ, z(h,θ)
%
and that mj /2 σj
$
θ, z(h,θ)
%
for some j 6= h. To obtain z(h,θ), h has only to adjust kh by which she becomes the winner
of the modulo game, which contradicts m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}%.
Case 6 : m falls into Rule 3.1
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Then, T (m) 6= ? and g (m) 2 YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
. Given thatm 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, it follows
from Assumption 2 that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}% for every h 2 H. Thus, in what follows, fix
any h 2 H.
Let first show that g (m) 2 M
&
YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
, θ
'
. To this end, fix any i 2 N and
any xi 2 YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
. By changing mi into m0i = (φ (θ) , x
i, ki, 2), i can induce Rule 3
with T (m0i,m−i) = T (m) \ {i}. To see this, note that in the case where xi 2 F (θ) it holds
that m0i /2 σi (θ, xi) and that mj /2 σj (θ, xi) for some j 6= i. To obtain xi, i has only
to adjust ki by which she becomes the winner of the modulo game. Since the choice of
xi 2 YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
is arbitrary, one can see that YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
⊆ g (Mi,m−i). Moreover,
given thatm 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}%, it holds that YT (m) &θT (m)' ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)). Since the choice
of i is arbitrary, one can also see that g (m) 2M
&
YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
, θ
'
.
Since g (m) 2M
&
YT (m)
&
θT (m)
'
, θ
'
\F (θ) and since T (m) 6= ?, Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)-
(b) implies that either
Case p: There exist i 2 T (m) and y 2 YT (m)\{i}
&
θ
T (m)
−i
'
such that yPi (θ) g (m); or
Case q: There exist h 2 H, with θh 6= θ if h 2 T (m), and w(h,θ) 2 YT (m)[{h}
&
θ
T (m)
−h , θ
'
\
Ih (θ, g (m) , Y ).
Suppose that Case p holds. Let us consider m0i = (φ (θ) , y, k
i, 2). Note that m0i /2
σi (θ, y) if y 2 F (θ). Also, note that mj /2 σj (θ, y) for some j 6= i if y 2 F (θ), given that m
falls into Rule 3.1. Then, (m0i,m−i) falls into Rule 3. If T (m
0
i,m−i) = ?, then (m0i,m−i) falls
into Rule 3.2. To obtain y, i has only to adjust ki by which she becomes the winner of the
modulo game. Therefore, (m0i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which contradicts that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}
%
.
Suppose that T (m0i,m−i) 6= ?. Then, (m0i,m−i) falls into Rule 3.1 and T (m0i,m−i) =
T (m) \ {i}. To obtain y, i has only to adjust ki by which she becomes the winner of the
modulo game. Therefore, (m0i,m−i) ≻Γ,θi m, which contradicts that m 2 NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}
%
.
Suppose that Case q holds. Note that for the deviant h it holds that mh /2 T Γh (θ) if
h 2 T (m). Also, note thatmh /2 T Γh (θ) if h /2 T (m). Let us considerm0h =
$
θ, w(h,θ), kh, 2
% 2
T Γh (θ). Note that m
0
h /2 σh
$
θ, w(h,θ)
%
if w(h,θ) 2 F (θ). Also, note that mj /2 σj
$
θ, w(h,θ)
%
for
some j 6= h if w(h,θ) 2 F (θ), given that m falls into Rule 3.1. Then, (m0h,m−h) falls into Rule
3.1 with T (m0h,m−h) = T (m)[ {h}. To obtain w(h,θ), h has only to adjust kh by which she
becomes the winner of the modulo game. Therefore, (m0h,m−h) ≻Γ,θh m, which contradicts
that m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,{h}%.
6.3 Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3, "only if" part - not for pub-
lication
Let us show that F satisfies Condition µ∗(i) and Condition µ∗(iii) with respect to Y ⊆ X
if it is partially-honest Nash implementable. Let Γ = (M, g) be the mechanism that partially-
honestly Nash implements F . Then, T Γi
$
θ¯
% 6= ? for every pair $i, θ¯% 2 N×Θ and, moreover,
F
$
θ¯
%
= NA
&
Γ,<Γ,θ¯,H¯
'
, for every pair
$
θ¯, H¯
% 2 Θ×H.
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The fact that F satisfies Condition µ∗(ii) with respect to Y ⊆ X follows from Theorem
1. In what follows, define Y as in the proof of Theorem 1; that is, Y ≡ g (M).
6.3.1 Proof of Condition µ∗(iii)-(A)
Fix any
&
x, θ, H, T, θ¯
T
'
2 Y ×Θ×H× P (N)×Θ|T | with θ¯T ≡
&
θ¯
j
'
j2T
.
To show that F satisfies Condition (A)-(0), fix any i 2 N and any θ¯i 2 Θ. Define
Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
as follows:
Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
≡ g
0@T Γi &θ¯i' , Y
j2N\{i}
Mj
1A . (A5)
Given that T Γi
&
θ¯
i
'
6= ?, by implementability, and that Y ≡ g (M), it follows that ? 6=
Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
⊆ Y .
Define YT
&
θ¯
T
'
as follows:
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ Y if T = ?; (A6)
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ g
0@Y
j2T
T Γj
&
θ¯
j
'
,
Y
i2N\T
Mi
1A if T 6= N ; (A7)
and
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
≡ g
 Y
j2T
T Γj
&
θ¯
j
'!
if T = N . (A8)
Given that T Γj
&
θ¯
j
'
6= ? for every j 2 T , one can see that YT
&
θ¯
T
'
6= ?. Also, by definition
of Y , it follows that YT
&
θ¯
T
'
⊆ Y . By definition of Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
and by definition of YT
&
θ¯
T
'
,
one can see that Yi
&
θ¯
i
'
= YT
&
θ¯
T
'
if T = {i}. Thus, F satisfied Condition (A)-(0).
Next, let us show that F meets Condition (A)-(a). Assume that x 2 M (Y, θ) \F (θ)
and that H = {h}. Fix any m 2 M such that g (m) = x. Since x /2 NA $Γ,<Γ,θ,H% = F (θ)
and x = g (m) 2 M (Y, θ), it must be the case that mh /2 T Γh (θ) and that there exists
m0h 2 T Γh (θ) such that g (m0h,m−h) Ih (θ) g (m). Let g (m0h,m−h) ≡ z(h,θ) and θh ≡ θ. Since
Yh
$
θh
%
is defined as in (A5), the outcome z(h,θ) ≡ g (m0h,m−h) 2 Yh
$
θh
% \ Ih $θh, x, Y %. We
are left to show that x /2 YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
, with YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
= Yh
$
θh
%
if T = ?. Let
T¯ ≡ T [ {h} and θ¯T¯ ≡
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
. Assume, to the contrary, that x 2 YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
. Then, there
exists m1 2 M such that g (m1) = x 2 YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
. It follows from the definition of YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
in (A7) if T¯ 6= N , or in (A8) if T¯ = N , that m1h 2 T Γh
$
θh
%
. Since H = {h}, it follows that
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g (m1) 2 NA $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, which is a contradiction. We conclude that F satisfies Condition
(A)-(a).
Let us show that F satisfies Condition (A)-(b). To this end, suppose that T 6= ?
and that x 2 M
&
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, θ
'
\F (θ). Since x 2 YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, it follows from the definition of
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
that there exists m 2 M such that g (m) = x and that mj 2 T Γj
&
θ¯
j
'
for every
j 2 T . Moreover, since g (m) /2 F (θ) = NA $Γ,<Γ,θ,H%, there exist i 2 N and m0i 2Mi such
that g (m0i,m−i)Ri (θ) g (m).
• Suppose that g (m0i,m−i)Pi (θ) g (m) for some m0i 2 Mi and some i 2 N . Note that
i 2 T if T = N . Also note that i 2 T if T 6= N . To see it, observe that since YT
&
θ¯
T
'
is
defined as in (A7) if T 6= N and since, moreover, g (m) 2 YT
&
θ¯
T
'
\M
&
YT
&
θ¯
T
'
, θ
'
,
it holds that g (Mk,m−k) ⊆ Lk (θ, g (m)) for every k 2 N\T , and so i 2 T . Thus, in
either case, i 2 T . Let T¯ ≡ T\ {i} and θ¯T¯ ≡
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
≡
&
θ¯
j
'
j2T¯
. Since mj 2 T Γj
&
θ¯
j
'
for every j 2 T\ {i}, it follows from the definition of YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
in (A7) if T¯ 6= N , or in
(A6) if T¯ = ?, that g (m0i,m−i) 2 YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
. Let g (m0i,m−i) ≡ y. Thus, we conclude
that y 2 YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
and i 2 T .
• Suppose that g (Mi,m−i) ⊆ Li (θ, g (m)) for every i 2 N . Since g (m) /2 F (θ) =
NA
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,H
%
, then for some h 2 H it holds that mh /2 T Γh (θ) and that there exists
m0h 2 T Γh (θ) such that g (m0h,m−h) Ih (θ) g (m). Let θ ≡ θh and w(h,θ) ≡ g (m0h,m−h).
We proceed according to whether h 2 T or not.
— Suppose that h 2 T . Let T¯ ≡ T and θ¯T¯ ≡
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
≡
D&
θ¯
j
'
j2T¯\{h}
, θh
E
.
Note that θ¯h 6= θ given that mh /2 T Γh (θ). Thus, θ¯h 6= θ if h 2 T . Define
YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
as in (A7) if T¯ 6= N , or as in (A8) if T¯ = N . It follows that w(h,θ) 2
YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
\ Ih
$
θh, x, Y
%
.
— Suppose that h /2 T . Let T¯ ≡ T [ {h} and θ¯T¯ ≡
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
≡
D&
θ¯
j
'
j2T
, θh
E
.
Note that T¯ 2 P (N). Define the set YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
as in (A7) if T¯ 6= N , or as in (A8)
if T¯ = N . Again, we have that w(h,θ) 2 YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
\ Ih
$
θh, x, Y
%
.
In summary, if the premises of Condition (A)-(b) are met, then either there exist i 2 T
and y 2 YT\{i}
&
θ¯
T
−i
'
such that yPi (θ) x; or there exist h 2 H, with θ¯h 6= θ if h 2 T , and
w(h,θ) 2 YT[{h}
&
θ¯
T
−h, θ
h
'
\ Ih
$
θh, x, Y
%
, where θh = θ. Thus, F satisfies Condition (A)-(b).
55
6.3.2 Proof of Condition µ∗(iii)-(B)
Fix any
&
x, θ, H, T, θ¯
T
'
2 Y × Θ × H× P (N) × Θ|T | with θ¯T ≡
&
θ¯
j
'
j2T
such that
x 2 F (θ). Moreover, fix any (i, θ0) 2 N × Θ. Suppose that z 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, z) and
z /2 F (θ0). Let T be such that:
(I) i 2 T =) z 2 Si
&
θ¯
i
;x, θ
'
; and
(II) T\ {i} 6= ? =) θ¯k = θ and x 2 Sk
&
θ¯
k
;x, θ
'
for any k 2 T\ {i}.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, given that x 2 F (θ) and given that N 2 H
by Assumption 2, there exists m 2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ,N% such that g (m) = x and Ci (θ, x) ≡
g (Mi,m−i). Moreover, z 2 Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, z) implies that there exists m0 ≡ (m0i,m−i)
such that g (m0) = z, and so z 2 Ci (θ, x) = g
$
Mi,m
0
−i
%
. For each ` 2 N , define Si (θ0;x, θ)
as in (A2). Note that if θ¯k = θ and x 2 Sk
&
θ¯
k
;x, θ
'
for any k 2 T\ {i}, then m 2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,N
%
is such that (mk)k2T\{i} 2
Q
k2T\{i}
T Γk (θ). Also, note that if i 2 T and
z = g (m0) 2 Si
&
θ¯
i
;x, θ
'
, then m0i 2 T Γi
&
θ¯
i
'
, where Si
&
θ¯
i
;x, θ
'
≡ g
&
T Γi
&
θ¯
i
'
,m−i
'
. Thus,
by definition of YT
&
θ¯
T
'
in (A7) if ? 6= T 6= N , or in (A8) if T = N , or in (A6) if T = ?,
one can see that g (m0) = z 2 YT
&
θ
T
'
.
Next, let one of the following three requirements hold:
(1) Si (θ
0;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ0, z) and T 6= ?;
(2) i /2 H;
(3) i 2 T with θ¯i = θ0.
First, let requirement (2) hold. Then, since z = g (m0) 2 Ci (θ, x) ≡ g
$
Mi,m
0
−i
% ⊆
Li (θ
0, z) but m0 /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ0,H% since z /2 F (θ0) = NA $Γ,<Γ,θ0,H%, it follows that either
there exists h 2 H\ {i} for whom it holds that m0h /2 T Γh (θ0) and that g
$
m00h,m
0
−h
%
Ih (θ
0) z
for some m00h 2 T Γh (θ0), or there exists j 2 N\ {i} such that g
$
m00j ,m
0
−j
%
Pj (θ
0) z for some
m00j 2Mj.
• Suppose that there exists j 2 N\ {i} such that g $m00j ,m0−j%Pj (θ0) z for somem00j 2Mj.
Let g
$
m00j ,m
0
−j
% ≡ z(j), T¯ = T\ {j} and θ¯T¯ ≡ θT−j ≡ &θ¯k'
k2T¯
. It follows from the
definition of YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
in (A7) if T¯ 6= N , or in (A6) if T¯ = ?, that z(j) 2 YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
, and
so statement (β) of Condition (B) holds if requirement (2) is met.
• Suppose that there exists h 2 H\ {i} for whom it holds that m0h /2 T Γh (θ0) and that
g
$
m00h,m
0
−h
%
Ih (θ
0) z for some m00h 2 T Γh (θ0). Note that if h 2 T , then property (II)
implies that θ¯h = θ. Then, if h 2 T , then θ0 6= θ; otherwise, m0h 2 T Γh (θ0), which is
a contradiction. Let z(h) ≡ g $m00h,m0−h% and θh ≡ θ0, and so z(h)Ih (θ0) z. Moreover,
let T¯ ≡ T\ {h} [ {h} and θ¯T¯ ≡
&
θ
T
−h, θ
h
'
≡
D&
θ¯
k
'
k2T\{h}
, θh
E
. it follows from
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the definition of YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
in (A7) if T¯ 6= N , or as in (A8) if T¯ = N , that z(h) 2
YT¯
&
θ¯
T¯
'
\ Ih
$
θh, z, Y
%
, and so statement (α) of Condition (B) holds if requirement (2)
is met.
Let requirement (1) hold. Since Si (θ
0;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ0, z), it cannot be that m0i 2 T Γi (θ0).
Thus, let m0i /2 T Γi (θ0). Furthermore, since Si (θ0;x, θ) ⊆ SLi (θ0, z), it follows from definition
of Si (θ
0;x, θ) in (A2) that g (m0)Pi (θ
0) g
$
m00i ,m
0
−i
%
for all m00i 2 T Γi (θ0), and so i cannot
find a profitable unilateral deviation from m0 if i 2 H. Of course, i cannot find a profitable
unilateral deviation from m0 if i /2 H given that Ci (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0, z), by assumption. Again,
since z = g (m0) 2 Ci (θ, x) ≡ g
$
Mi,m
0
−i
% ⊆ Li (θ0, z) but m0 /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ0,H% since
z /2 F (θ0) = NA $Γ,<Γ,θ0,H%, it follows that either there exists h 2 H\ {i} for whom it
holds that m0h /2 T Γh (θ0) and that g
$
m00h,m
0
−h
%
Ih (θ
0) z for some m00h 2 T Γh (θ0), or there exists
j 2 N\ {i} such that g $m00j ,m0−j%Pj (θ0) z for some m00j 2 Mj. By the same argument used
for the case where requirement (2) holds, we see that either statement (α) or statement (β)
of Condition (B) holds if requirement (1) is met.
Let requirement (3) hold. This means that m0i 2 T Γi (θ0) = T Γi
&
θ¯
i
'
. Again, since
z = g (m0) 2 Ci (θ, x) ≡ g
$
Mi,m
0
−i
% ⊆ Li (θ0, z) but m0 /2 NE $Γ,<Γ,θ0,H% since z /2 F (θ0) =
NA
$
Γ,<Γ,θ0,H
%
, it follows that either there exists h 2 H\ {i} for whom it holds that m0h /2
T Γh (θ
0) and that g
$
m00h,m
0
−h
%
Ih (θ
0) z for some m00h 2 T Γh (θ0), or there exists j 2 N\ {i} such
that g
$
m00j ,m
0
−j
%
Pj (θ
0) z for some m00j 2Mj. By the same argument used for the case where
requirement (2) holds, we see that either statement (α) or statement (β) of Condition (B)
holds if requirement (3) is met.
6.3.3 Proof of Condition µ∗(i)
To show that F satisfies Condition µ∗(i), take any θ, θ0 2 Θ such that x 2 F (θ) \F (θ0)
and C` (θ, x) ⊆ L` (θ0, x) for all ` 2 N . Given that N 2 H, by Assumption 2, there existsm 2
NE
$
Γ,<Γ,θ,N
%
such that g (m) = x. Define Ci (θ, x) as in (A1) and Si (θ
0;x, θ) as in (A2).
Fix any H. Since g (m) /2 NA $Γ,<Γ,θ0,H% and since C` (θ, x) ≡ g (M`,m−`) ⊆ L` (θ0, x) for
all ` 2 N , it follows there exists h 2 H for whom mh /2 T Γh (θ0) and there exists m0h 2 T Γh (θ0)
such that g (m0h,m−h) Ih (θ
0) g (m). Then, by the definition of Sh (θ
0;x, θ) ≡ g $T Γh (θ0) ,m−h%,
g (m0h,m−h) 2 Sh (θ0;x, θ) \ Ih (θ0, x, Y ) holds. Thus, F satisfies Condition µ∗(i).
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